By Jennifer Xin-Tsu Lin Levine
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 5 2025 – United Nations aid organizations are rallying after a series of earthquakes and powerful aftershocks wreaked unprecedented havoc across eastern Afghanistan—particularly in the mountainous provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar.

Preliminary reports show that at least 1,400 people were killed and more than 3,100 injured. Widespread destruction of homes and critical infrastructure has displaced thousands more, while rockfalls and landslides have slowed rescue teams’ efforts to reach remote communities.

In response, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released 10 million US Dollars within hours of the earthquake to provide shelter, food, water, child protection, and healthcare.

Countries including the United Kingdom and South Korea have pledged money through the United Nations—the UK does not recognize the Taliban government. Working alongside OCHA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is working with local partners to link immediate humanitarian assistance with long-term recovery and resilience-building strategies. The United Nations is also preparing an emergency appeal, with an initial USD 5 million from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) already released.

UNHCR’s partner, AREWO, assesses the needs of the population affected by the earthquake that hit the region on 31 August. Credit: UNHCR/ARWEO

Despite these rapid mobilizations, questions remain about whether the flow of aid can be sustained. Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, warned, “This is the latest crisis to expose the cost of shrinking resources on vital humanitarian work. Massive funding cuts have already brought essential health and nutrition services for millions to a halt, grounded aircraft, which are often the only lifeline to remote communities, and forced aid agencies to reduce their footprint.”

He urged donors to “once again” step up for the people of Afghanistan, rallying resources for those in need.

Against this backdrop of urgency and shrinking resources, UNDP officials have sought to outline a vision for recovery that extends beyond immediate survival.

Stephen Rodriguez, UNDP’s resident representative in Afghanistan, addresses a UN press conference via videolink on the impact of the earthquakes on the country and its people. Credit: Jennifer Xin-Tsu Lin Levine/IPS

Stephen Rodriguez, UNDP’s resident representative in Afghanistan, emphasized that the country is facing a “perfect economic storm.”

In a press briefing, he shared data from the UN’s 25 assessment teams showing that 84,000 people have been affected by the earthquake so far.

Rodriguez also detailed the UNDP’s initiative of “community-driven recovery,” which includes cash support for families clearing rubble and rebuilding homes. Pointing to the success of a similar community-oriented approach after the 2023 earthquake in Herat, he called on member states to join the initiative in “building back better,” improving infrastructure and uniting communities.

Both Rodriguez and other UN representatives also addressed the additional challenges created by restrictions on women and girls in Afghanistan and how they affect UN work.

Aid groups are barred from recruiting female aid workers, and as UN Women Afghanistan Special Representative Susan Ferguson said, “women and girls could miss out on lifesaving assistance or information in the days ahead.”

However, Rodriguez denied any organized effort to block women’s access to humanitarian services and medical aid. He described reports of women being prevented from getting emergency medical care as “isolated incidents… rather than a systematic restriction.”

Despite these concerns and the reluctance of some countries to channel funds through Afghanistan’s authorities, UN officials stressed that the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence remain central to their engagement with the Taliban.

Rodriguez recalled difficulties during the 2023 earthquake recovery that have since been resolved and stated that closer coordination has enabled aid to reach mountainous areas with the Taliban’s helicopters.

He called the “growth” in the relationship between the UN and the Taliban “exemplary,” citing their “full understanding that humanity comes first, tending to those most in need, irrespective of ethnicity, of gender, of anything else.”

For now, the focus remains on immediate survival—reaching those trapped beneath debris or isolated from aid, providing food and clean water, and preventing disease outbreaks. But UN officials emphasize that rebuilding shattered homes and livelihoods will require far more than emergency aid—it necessitates sustained support and long-term commitment.

IPS UN Bureau Report

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Excerpt:

After a series of earthquakes and aftershocks struck Afghanistan this week, the United Nations and its member states have been prioritizing “community-driven recovery.”

By CIVICUS
Sep 5 2025 –  
CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Angola with Florindo Chivucute, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, a US-based civil society organisation established in 2014 that works to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in Angola.

The Angolan government’s 1 July decision to remove diesel subsidies, sharply pushing up public transport costs, triggered a series of protests. Angola is one of Africa’s biggest oil producers, but many have seen little benefit from its oil wealth and continue to live in poverty. People have taken to the streets in unprecedented numbers to demand an end to corruption and mismanagement, presenting the ruling party, in power for 50 years, with its biggest test. Security forces have responded to incidences of looting and vandalism with lethal violence. At least 30 people have been killed, 277 injured and over 1,500 arrested.

What triggered the protests?

Fuel subsidy cuts sparked the crisis. The protests began on 28 July, after the government’s decision to remove diesel subsidies immediately pushed up fuel prices. What started as a drivers’ strike in Luanda, the capital, quickly spread to other provinces and escalated into bigger protests.

The impact was devastating. For many families, even a small rise in fuel costs is crushing, because wages have been eroded by years of recession and currency devaluation. When transport costs rise, food prices and school fees rise too, leaving those already struggling unable to make ends meet.

But fuel was just the trigger. The unrest reflected much deeper frustrations, including high unemployment, particularly among young people, growing poverty and anger at corruption and mismanagement. People see public resources channelled into luxury spending and infrastructure deals benefiting a few powerful figures connected to the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while basic services and jobs are neglected. Combined with the immediate shock of higher fuel prices, these grievances fuelled widespread anger.

Why are people struggling in such a resource-rich country?

This is the irony at the heart of the crisis. Angola produces large quantities of oil, along with diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits. Mismanagement and entrenched corruption are central to the problem. Revenues from natural resources have too often been captured by networks close to political power and channelled abroad or invested in ways that don’t create jobs.

Angola’s dependence on fuel imports makes the situation worse. We don’t have sufficient domestic refining capacity. Instead of using oil revenues to build refineries and strengthen local industry, a system emerged in which those with political connections profited from importing refined products back into the country. This removed incentives to invest in local processing or agriculture. The result is a tiny wealthy elite and a large majority with very low wages and limited access to services.

What do these protests reveal about the government’s grip on power?

The protests have marked a turning point. The MPLA has dominated politics since independence in 1975, and large-scale protests are not common. The fact that so many people were willing to take to the streets, particularly in and around the capital, shows growing discontent with the government and ruling party.

The authorities’ reaction has been heavy-handed. Security forces have used teargas and live ammunition in some cases, and carried out numerous arrests, including of union leaders and journalists. In some areas protests were accompanied by looting and, tragically, by deadly clashes with security forces. Civil society has since called for investigations into the killings and for accountability for those responsible.

The government’s strategy risks backfiring. By responding with force and detentions, it risks creating a greater sense of mistrust and frustration, which could influence how people engage with political processes as we approach the 2027 election.

How is civil society organising and what challenges does it face?

Civil society – including church groups, trade unions and local associations — has mobilised quickly to call for accountability and transparency. New coalitions are forming; for example, groups such as the Bishops’ Conference of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe’s Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Friends of Angola, the Justice, Peace and Democracy Association and Pro Bono Angola are working with religious organisations to push for investigations into the killings and provide humanitarian support to families affected by the unrest.

But the environment is hostile. Funding for democracy and human rights work is scarce, so organisations struggle to pay staff or sustain programmes.

State surveillance creates another barrier. The state has invested heavily in surveillance infrastructure, and civil society organisations are often targeted by cyber intrusions and closely monitored. The legacy of communist authoritarian rule creates deep mistrust, which makes organising more difficult.

Language barriers limit international support. Much of the work happens in Portuguese, which limits reach to the wider international audience that often communicates in English, French or Spanish.

Additional restrictions threaten to further tighten civic space. Recent draconian measures include the 2024 National Security Bill and the Bill on the Crime of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. In addition, the 2023 draft law on Non-Governmental Organizations, approved by presidential decree, imposed harsh regulations. These restrictive laws and policies undermine fundamental freedoms and, if fully implemented, risk worsening the already limited environment for civil society in Angola.

What would it take to address the underlying problems?

Strong political will is needed to tackle corruption and manage public finances transparently. This means opening up procurement and fiscal data, pursuing accountability for past abuses, and ensuring resource revenues are channelled into public priorities such as hospitals, local industry and schools. Investment in education, healthcare and small-scale agriculture would create jobs, strengthen livelihoods and reduce dependence on imports.

Institutional reform is equally vital. This means protecting property rights, improving the business environment so investment generates employment and strengthening an independent judiciary and electoral processes so people can seek change through democratic channels.

International partners have a role to play by supporting electoral transparency and demanding accountability from companies and governments that operate in Angola.

The 2027 election will offer a crucial test. The international community should pay close attention and support reforms that increase transparency and electoral integrity. Electoral reforms and the clear, public release of results at the local level would go a long way towards restoring confidence in democratic processes.

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SEE ALSO
Angola: ‘Criticising the government means risking arbitrary detention, intimidation and physical assault’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro Paka 30.Jul.2025
Angola: Repressive new laws threaten civic space CIVICUS Monitor 15.Sep.2024
Angola: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Emilio José Manuel 01.Jan.2025

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By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 – The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.

After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.

Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.

This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).

And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.

Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).

In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.

Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.

Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):

1) Apart from some closed events earlier on in the negotiations, there now seems to be an almost total lack of intersessional activities (both formal and informal) essential for the further building of trust and understanding of each other’s positions (although some may be planned but are not yet announced). Regional efforts, in particular, might help to bridge some of the wide differences that are apparent, even within regions (where there is clearly a lack of consensus as well).

2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.

3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.

4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.

This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.

How to solve this as we try to move forward?

1) Make every possible attempt to put into place a proper, formal, and transparent intersessional process (along with informal and regional activities as needed), even if it results in a significant delay until the next INC (5.3). A rumour is going round that INC 5.3 may be scheduled for February, 2026. In my opinion this is far too soon if a properly designed intersessional process, focused on bridging the key gaps and reaching some sort of consensus, at least informally, is to be realized. An adequate “break” is needed to clearly think through all the options. If needed, even keep bringing in the UN Secretary-General to “knock heads together” to find some compromises in advance of the next negotiations. And report back to all INC participants regarding the process of intersessional work on a regular basis.

2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).

3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.

4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).

5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.

This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.

¹ https://www.forbes.com/sites/trondarneundheim/2025/08/16/plastics-manufacturing-at-crossroads-pivot-to-lead-or-lose/

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

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