By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Dec 16 2025 – 2025 has been an especially turbulent year for humanitarian aid operations as global aid budgets have experienced record declines in funding. As conflicts, environmental disasters, and economic crises intensify and disproportionately impact the world’s most vulnerable communities, the resources available in global emergency funds are falling far short of rapidly growing needs.

For 2026, humanitarian agencies project that even more people may be left without critical support if funding gaps continue to widen. In response, the United Nations (UN) and its partners are urgently calling on the international community to mobilize increased support for its Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) at an annual pledging event to commemorate the fund’s 20th anniversary on December 12.

“The humanitarian system’s tank is running on empty – with millions of lives hanging in the balance,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “This is a moment when we are asked to do more and more, with less and less. This is simply unsustainable.”

According to figures from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA ), the UN aims to save 87 million lives next year, which will require approximately USD 23 billion in funding. In addition, the agency seeks to raise about USD 33 billion to support 135 million people across 50 countries through 23 national aid operations, along with six additional operations dedicated to refugees and migrants.

Despite the urgent global need for increased support, funding for humanitarian appeals has faltered more steeply than ever before, with contributions for budgets at the lowest levels recorded in decades. The appeal for 2025, which called for USD 12 billion, reached roughly 25 million less people than the previous year.

OCHA recorded a multitude of immediate consequences around the world– including an exacerbation of the global hunger crisis, increasingly strained health systems to the point of near collapse, the erosion of critical education programs, and a considerable blow to protection services for vulnerable displaced communities facing protracted armed conflicts. In some contexts, it has been increasingly dangerous for aid workers, with more than 320 killed this year amid what officials describe as an “utter disregard for the laws of war”.

“So when we’re needed at full strength, the warning lights are flashing,” said Tom Fletcher, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. “It’s not just a funding gap – it’s an operational emergency. And if the CERF falters, then the world’s emergency service will falter. And the people who rely on us will suffer.”

With resources in desperately short supply, the UN and its partners have been forced to scale back certain lifesaving services to prioritize others, leaving urgent humanitarian crises critically underfunded. Due to these strategic allocations, the UN has been largely unable to assist numerous displaced communities fleeing from conflict in Darfur, Sudan– which has been described as “the epicenter of human suffering.”

“As you’ve heard and as you know, the brutal cuts that we’re experiencing have forced us to make brutal choices, a ruthless triage of human survival,” Fletcher added. “This is what it means when we put power before solidarity and compassion.”

UN officials also underscored the extreme importance of CERF, as the fund has acted as a lifeline for vulnerable communities around the world for decades, delivering over USD 10 billion worth of aid in more than 110 countries since 2006. Through these efforts, CERF has acted as a “rapid and strategic” source of financing that reached struggling civilians before other sources, saving countless lives.

According to Guterres, “in many places, CERF has made the difference between life-saving help and no help at all.” Earlier this year, when humanitarian operations were allowed to resume in the Gaza Strip, CERF helped deliver vital fuel supplies to hospitals, restore water and sanitation systems, and reinforce other essential lifesaving services.

In 2025, CERF invested nearly USD 212 million to sustain relief efforts across underfunded crises. The UN also announced an additional allocation of USD 100 million to meet critical needs—including those of women and girls—in severe crises in Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Haiti, Myanmar, Mozambique, Syria, among others.

To date, CERF has supported millions of people across 30 countries and territories through a total allocation of USD 435 million. These funds have ensured the scale-up of humanitarian efforts in Gaza following the implementation of the ceasefire, and provided critical assistance to those fleeing armed conflict in Darfur.

These efforts by CERF solidify the center of the “humanitarian reset” that the UN foresees for 2026. “And that’s why the Humanitarian Reset matters: not a slogan, but a challenge to us all,” added Fletcher. “A mission, but also a survival strategy for the work we do and for so many people. It’s about being smarter, faster, closer to the communities we serve, more honest about the difficult trade-offs that we face. Making every dollar count for those we serve.”

The UN’s largest individual humanitarian response plan in 2026 will focus on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which requires roughly USD 4.1 billion to assist roughly 3 million people who have experienced catastrophic levels of violence and destruction. Other response efforts will target Sudan—the world’s largest displacement crisis—which requires USD 2.9 billion to assist 20 million people, and Syria, which requires USD 2.8 billion to help 8.6 million people.

With funding for CERF at its lowest projected levels in over a decade, the UN seeks a funding target of USD 1 billion, and will begin appealing to its member states for support. Countries are also being urged to use their influence to bolster protection measures for civilians and humanitarian workers, as well as to reinforce accountability mechanisms for perpetrators of armed violence.

“We have to imagine, even now, in this tough moment for humanitarian funding, what the next 20 years could look like with a fully funded CERF,” said Fletcher. “A fund that makes the UN faster, smarter, more cost-effective, greener, more anticipatory, more inclusive. A fund that amplifies the voices of communities and proves that solidarity still works. Backed by a movement of citizens who believe in that solidarity.”

IPS UN Bureau

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By Judith Kohlenberger
VIENNA, Austria, Dec 16 2025 – The debate on reforming the European asylum system has gained significant momentum following the agreement reached by EU interior ministers last week. Alongside questions of solidarity and distribution, the possibility of establishing ‘return hubs’ outside the EU was at the heart of the meeting.

Outsourcing asylum procedures – or at least those concerning rejected asylum seekers – has long been a desire of many heads of state and government, and the European Commission now aims to make this possible by creating the necessary legal foundations, for example by scrapping the so-called connection criterion. In future, rejected asylum seekers would therefore no longer need to demonstrate a personal link to the third country to which they are transferred.

Previously, such links included earlier stays or family members living there. Yet the EU remains a long way from concrete implementation.

One reason is the high cost of such outsourcing projects. According to the UK’s National Audit Office, the British Rwanda deal cost the equivalent of more than €800 million, with limited effect: only four asylum seekers were relocated over two years.

Under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the plan was shelved for good due to excessive costs and minimal benefit. And despite the heated migration debate in the United Kingdom, a revival appears unlikely. Denmark faced a similar situation with its own Rwanda plans, which the country put on hold in 2023 due to unfeasibility. And then there is the much-cited Italy–Albania agreement, whose original idea – conducting asylum procedures under Italian law on Albanian soil – was never implemented.

Practical implementation remains doubtful

What third countries gain from allowing such outsourcing on their territory is obvious: money, and even more importantly, political capital. Speaking on a panel at the ‘Time to Decide Europe’ conference organised by the Vienna-based ERSTE Foundation, Albania’s Prime Minister and Socialist Edi Rama stated openly that his small country of just under three million people must join any alliance willing to take it in.

This includes – and above all – the EU. For Albania, which is an EU candidate country, it therefore makes sense to appear accommodating to a not insignificant member state with which it is also historically closely connected, and to help solve its unpopular ‘migration question’, at least to the extent that refugees arriving in Italy do receive protection, but, in practice, ‘not in my backyard’.

So far, however, this principle has not been put into action due to objections raised by Italian courts. That is also why – and to put the costly asylum camps built in the Albanian towns of Shëngjin and Gjadër (construction and operations are believed to have already cost hundreds of millions of euros) to some use – the European Commission created the option of return hubs, which were formally adopted last week at the meeting of EU ministers.

Italy can therefore repurpose the facilities originally intended for asylum procedures as deportation centres for asylum seekers who were already on Italian territory and whose applications have been legally rejected. Here too, the number of cases remains limited, and it is unclear on what legal basis those transferred there could be held for extended periods to prevent them from re-entering the EU via Montenegro and Bosnia. De facto detention, however, would present yet another legal complication, even if the connection criterion and other EU-law barriers are removed.

Anyone striving for ‘fair burden-sharing’ would have to redistribute towards Europe, not away from it.

There is, therefore, still a long way to go before any concrete return hubs become reality. Not only because, in the usual trilogue process, the European Parliament must also give its approval — and some MEPs, including Birgit Sippel of the Socialists and Democrats group, have already announced their opposition.

But even if a parliamentary majority can be secured, the practical implementation remains doubtful: where are the trustworthy and willing third countries; how can infrastructure be built there; how can respect for human rights standards be monitored and enforced from Europe (which proves difficult even within an EU member state such as Hungary); and how should looming legal disputes be handled?

Among the countries mentioned so far are several that themselves regularly appear among the places of origin of refugees arriving in Europe. Alongside Rwanda, the East African state of Uganda is frequently cited; it already hosts the largest number of refugees from other parts of Africa, especially from Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Like Rwanda, it lies directly next to regional conflict zones; the protection rate for Ugandan nationals in European host countries stands at around 60 per cent.

The country is considered authoritarian — and precisely for that reason, it has an interest in striking an outsourcing deal with EU member states, such as the one it has already concluded with the Netherlands. Such an agreement implicitly acknowledges and legitimises the Ugandan government.

The notorious EU–Turkey Statement of 2016 demonstrated how refugees accommodated in third countries can repeatedly be used as leverage in foreign policy disputes, for example when Prime Minister Erdoğan had them bussed to the Greek border to put pressure on the EU. EU strategists may euphemistically call this ‘migration diplomacy’, but for the layperson, it is simply blackmail.

The example of Uganda illustrates not only how Europe, through deals with third countries, outsources not just refugees but also bargaining power and control; it also reflects the fundamental imbalance in a one-sided debate on externalisation.

Already today, 71 per cent of all refugees find protection in developing and emerging countries, with 66 per cent hosted in neighbouring countries in the Global South or the Middle East and North Africa. Anyone striving for ‘fair burden-sharing’ would therefore have to redistribute towards Europe, not away from it.

Europe’s answer cannot, under any circumstances, be to emulate the Trump administration by resorting to ever-tougher asylum policies.

This leads to the fundamental questions that EU policymakers appear increasingly unwilling to ask, let alone answer: How does Europe want to position itself in future with regard to global refugee protection? How will people in need of protection from persecution – whose numbers are rising in an ever more unstable world – gain access to that protection?

How can the liberal post-war order be preserved, including and especially the Geneva Conventions, which were created in response to the lessons of the two World Wars and the Shoah? How should Europe position itself vis-à-vis an increasingly illiberal, in parts authoritarian United States, which now tends to view Europe more as an adversary than a partner?

A confident response to the new US national security strategy – which claims that migration threatens Europe with ‘civilisational erasure’ – must lie in emphasising Europe’s civilisational achievements since 1945. These include, above all, the prohibition of torture enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights: it applies absolutely, and therefore also to asylum seekers who are obliged to leave and who may not be deported to countries where they risk inhuman treatment. This is precisely where the line between civilisation and barbarism lies.

Furthermore, a united Europe that wants to stand its ground against attacks from former allies must recognise societal diversity as one of its strengths, and acknowledge the indispensable contribution that migrants – from guest workers and refugees to highly skilled expats – have made to Europe’s reconstruction and prosperity.

Europe’s answer cannot, under any circumstances, be to emulate the Trump administration by resorting to ever-tougher asylum policies that effectively validate the American assessment.

For that would indeed amount to an obliteration — an obliteration of the founding idea of a united, open and liberal Europe which, let us not forget, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 and stands for a rules-based order that has ensured decades of peace as well as economic prosperity. In short: for the very life that we are fortunate enough to enjoy day after day, in diversity, security and freedom.

Dr Judith Kohlenberger heads the FORM research institute at WU Vienna and is affiliated with the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, the Jacques Delors Centre Berlin and the Einstein Centre Digital Future. Her book Das Fluchtparadox (The Flight Paradox) was named Austrian Science Book of the Year in 2023 and nominated for the German Non-Fiction Prize. Her most recent publication is Migrationspanik (Migration Panic) (2025).

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS), Brussels, Belgium

IPS UN Bureau

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By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan
KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, Dec 16 2025 – The new US National Security Strategy (NSS) repositions the superpower’s role in the world. Hence, foreign policy will be mainly driven by considerations of ‘making America great again’ (MAGA).

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Changing course
The new NSS no longer presumes US world leadership and alliances based on values. It breaks with earlier post-Cold War foreign policy, upsetting those committed to its sovereigntist unipolar world.

Quietly released on December 4, it is certainly not an easily forgettable update of long-established positions, cloaked in obscure bureaucratic and diplomatic parlance.

Mainly drafted under the leadership of ‘neo-con’ Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio, it is already seen as the most significant document of Trump 2.0.

It asserts, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” Instead, foreign policy should now prioritise advancing US interests.

New priorities
The NSS implies the US will no longer be the world’s policeman. Instead, it will exercise power selectively, prioritising transactional rather than strategic considerations.

It emphasises economic strength as key to national security, rebuilding industrial capacity, securing supply chains and ensuring the US never relies on others for critical materials.

K Kuhaneetha Bai

Even if the Supreme Court overrules the President’s tariffs, the US has already secured many concessions from governments fearful of their likely adverse impacts.

The NSS is ostensibly based on MAGA considerations involving immigration control, hemispheric dominance, and cultural ethno-chauvinism.

Mainstream commentators complain it lacks the supposedly enlightened values underlying foreign policy in the US-dominated world order after the Second World War.

They complain the new NSS is narrow in focus, redefining interests, and sharing power. Its stance and tone are said to be more 19th-century than 21st-century.

Besides pragmatic imperatives, mixed messages may be due to unsatisfactory compromises among rival factions in Trump’s administration.

MAGA foreign policy
Long-term observers see the NSS as unprecedented and blatantly ideological.

White supremacist ideology influences not only national cultural politics but also foreign policy. The NSS unapologetically promotes Judaeo-Christian chauvinism despite the constitutional separation of church from state.

MAGA’s ‘America First’ priority is evident throughout. Border security is crucial as immigration is deemed the primary national security concern.

For Samuel Huntington, immigration threatens the US by making it less WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant).

The NSS blames social and economic breakdown on immigration. Inflows into the Western Hemisphere, not just the US, must be urgently stopped by all available means.

Ironically, the US has long been a nation of immigrants, with relatively more immigrants than any European country. Its non-white numbers are almost equal to whites.

Trump’s neocolonial interpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine emphasises the Americas as the new foreign policy priority.

Foreign rivals must not be allowed to acquire strategic assets, ports, mines, or infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean, mainly to keep China out.

Trump’s NSS prioritises the Western Hemisphere, with Asia second. Africa receives three paragraphs, primarily for its minerals.

Europe is downgraded to third, due to its ostensible immigration-induced civilizational decline. Surprisingly, the NSS urges halting North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansion.

China near peer!
The NSS policy on China is widely viewed as unexpectedly restrained. China remains a priority, but is no longer its primary antagonist; it is now a peer competitor.

Now, the US must rebalance its economic relationship with China based on mutually beneficial reciprocity, fairness, and the resurgence of US manufacturing.

The US will continue to work with allies to limit China’s growth and technological progress. However, China is allowed to develop green technologies due to US disinterest.

Meanwhile, US hawks have ensured a military ‘overmatch’ for Taiwan. The NSS emphasises Taiwan’s centrality to Indo-Pacific security and world chip production.

The NSS warns China would gain access to the Second Island Chain if it captured Taiwan, reshaping regional power and threatening vital US trade routes.

With allied support, the US military will seek to contain China within the First Island Chain. However, Taiwan fears US support will wane after TSMC chip production moves to the US.

The NSS expects the ‘Quad’ of the US, Australia, Japan and India to enhance Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, only India can balance China in Asia, and is hence crucial to contain China in the long term.

Regional reordering
The NSS also downgrades the Middle East (ME). Conditions that once made the region important have changed.

The ME’s importance stemmed from its petroleum and Western guilt over Israel. Now, the US has become a significant oil and gas exporter.

Critically, the US strike on Iran in mid-2025 is believed to have set back Tehran’s nuclear programme.

The ME seems unlikely to continue to drive US strategic planning as it has over the last half-century. For the US, the region is now expected to be a major investor.

As US foreign policy is redefined, the world worries. The ME has been downgraded as Latin America has become the new frontline region.

Much has happened in less than a year of Trump 2.0, with little clear or consistent pattern of continuity or change from his first term. But policies have also been quickly reversed or revised.

While the NSS is undoubtedly important and indicative, it would be presumptuous to think it will actually determine policy over the next three years, or even in the very near future.

IPS UN Bureau

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