By Jackson Okata
NAIROBI, Jul 7 2025 – When Jean Baremba arrived in Kenya in 2018, he looked forward to rebuilding a life shattered by war in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

The 42-year-old father of four says he escaped DR Congo to save his children after the death of their mother in a 2017 dawn attack by rebel fighters on their village.

“The rebels were forcibly recruiting men to fight for their army. Those resisting were killed and their property torched. I managed to escape; unfortunately, my wife lost her life,” Baremba told IPS.

A skilled carpenter, Baremba and his four children found their way into the Kakuma refugee camp, 497 miles northwest of Kenya’s Capital, Nairobi.

“Despite all the challenges, Kakuma gave me a second life and renewed hope.”

A Growing Challenge

Kenya hosts approximately 836,907 refugees and asylum seekers, with 51 percent of this population residing in Dadaab Refugee Camp, 36 percent in Kakuma Refugee Camp, and 13 percent in urban areas. The numbers comprise 73 percent refugees and 27 percent asylum-seekers.

Over the years, the ever-rising number of people seeking refuge in Kenya, especially from the Great Lakes region, has continued to exert pressure on the East African nation amid reduced global donor and humanitarian aid and support.

Kenya’s Department of Refugee Services has 220,000 pending refugee and asylum seeker applications.

Initially, the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) was in charge of refugee seekers’ management, but the Kenyan government took over in 2021 following the passage of the Refugee Act.

To solve the refugee crisis, the Kenyan government launched a plan to transform all refugees and asylum seekers into the Kenyan community by transitioning the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps into integrated settlements.

The five-year transition plan, dubbed the Shirika Plan, aims to transform the refugee camps into integrated settlements for both refugees and host communities to make refugees economically self-reliant.

Shirika is a Swahili word for “coming together” or “partnering.”

The plan will allow refugees to access education, health, government identity cards, business permits, and banking services.

Additionally, refugees will be issued government tax numbers to enable them to open bank accounts and register and operate businesses.

At the same time, the plan will allow refugees to travel and live in any part of Kenya without a special movement permit.

The plan will see refugee students receive government education scholarships to enable them to pursue college and university education.

To enhance access to health services for refugees, the plan allows them to be listed on the Social Health Insurance Fund (SHIF), a government-managed public health fund.

Self-Reliance

For people like Baremba, being allowed to live like other Kenyans will grant refugees the much-needed economic independence.

“Integration will allow me to put my carpentry skills to work, and the Kenyan community will form part of my market,” Baremba said.

He added, “With a source of income, I will no longer rely on support from UNHCR.”

Mary Ajok, a South Sudanese refugee, hopes that the implementation of the Shirika plan will provide a permanent solution to crowded shelters, limited food rations and lack of proper healthcare services plaguing refugees in the camps.

“Raising children in a refugee camp can be challenging. Integration provides a peaceful and friendly environment for children,” Ajok told IPS.

Ajok hopes to establish a catering business to serve both refugees and the host community of Kakuma.

“Majority of refugees have various skills that can be put to use and contribute to the growth of Kenya’s economy,” she said.

Funding

During the official launch of the Shirika Plan at State House, Nairobi, President William Ruto said, “The plan will upgrade refugee management, shifting from humanitarian dependency to a more inclusive and progressive development model centered on human rights.”

US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Marc Dillard, who also doubles as the chair of the Refugee Donor Group, describes the Shirika plan as a milestone for advancing socio-economic conditions and human rights for refugees in Kenya.

The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) will work with the Kenyan government to implement the Shirika Plan.

The plan’s implementation budget is estimated to be USD 943 million. Kenya’s Minister for National Administration, Kipchumba Murkomen, has been meeting refugee donor groups appealing for funding to implement the plan.

The World Bank, UNHCR, International Finance Corporation and the Kenya Commercial Bank Group have pledged to fund the plan’s implementation.

Global and Regional Goals

The Shirika Plan contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS) and the AU Agenda 2063 and aligns with global commitments such as the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) of 2018, the 1969 OAU convention, the 1951 UN convention, and the 1967 UN convention

Inclusivity and non-discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, gender, or any other grounds are key guiding principles for the plan.

For refugees not keen on being integrated, the plan provides pathways for voluntary repatriation to stable home countries and third-country resettlement for deserving, vulnerable refugees.

Opposing Voices

The refugee integration plan is, however, facing resistance from a section of political leaders from Northern Kenya, citing inadequate consultations.

Farah Maalim and Daniel Epuyo, Members of Parliament representing Dadaab and Turkana West constituencies, have accused the government of Kenya and UNHCR of hurriedly rolling out the plan.

The two legislators are instead pushing for the repatriation of refugees back to their home countries.

“We cannot talk of integrating refugees when locals have pressing needs that are yet to be met,” Epuyo said.

Maalim said, “The Hosting Communities of Refugees are not ready for integration. Most refugees would opt for voluntary repatriation with generous assistance to enable them to reintegrate back in Somalia.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

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By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 7 2025 – When Bangladesh’s streets erupted in protest in mid-2024, few could have predicted how swiftly Sheikh Hasina’s regime would crumble. The ousting of the prime minister last August, after years of mounting authoritarianism and growing discontent, was heralded as a historic opportunity for democratic renewal. Almost a year on, the question remains whether Bangladesh is genuinely evolving towards democracy, or if one form of repression is replacing another.

The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, confronts enormous challenges in delivering meaningful change. While it has taken significant steps – releasing political prisoners, initiating constitutional reforms, signing international human rights treaties and pursuing accountability for past violations – persistent abuses, political exclusion and economic instability continue to cast long shadows over the transition. The coming months will prove decisive in determining whether Bangladesh can truly break from its authoritarian past.

From electoral fraud to revolution

The roots of Bangladesh’s current upheaval trace back to the deeply flawed general election of 7 January 2024. The vote, which saw Hasina’s Awami League (AL) secure a fourth consecutive term, was widely dismissed as a foregone conclusion. The main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted the election in protest at the government’s refusal to reinstate a neutral caretaker system.

The government unleashed an intense crackdown ahead of the vote. It imprisoned thousands of opposition activists and weaponised the criminal justice system to silence dissent, leading to deaths in police custody and enforced disappearances. This repression extended to civil society, with human rights activists and journalists facing harassment, arbitrary detention and violence. The government sponsored fake opposition candidates to create an illusion of competition, resulting in plummeting voter turnout and a crisis of legitimacy.

When opposition rallies occurred, they were met with overwhelming force. On 28 October 2023, police responded to a major opposition protest in Dhaka with rubber bullets, teargas and stun grenades, resulting in at least 16 deaths, with thousands injured and detained.

The situation deteriorated further after the election. In June 2024, the reinstatement of a controversial quota system for public sector jobs triggered mass student-led protests that would ultimately topple Hasina’s government. These protests rapidly evolved into a broader revolt against entrenched corruption, economic inequality and political impunity.

The government’s response was systematically brutal. According to a United Nations fact-finding report, between July and August security forces killed as many as 1,400 people, including many children, often shooting protesters at point-blank range. They denied the injured medical care and intimidated hospital staff. The scale of violence eventually led the military to refuse further involvement, forcing Hasina to resign and flee Bangladesh.

Reform efforts amid political discord

The interim government identified three core priorities: institutional reforms, trials of perpetrators of political violence and elections. Its initial months brought significant progress. The government released detained protesters and human rights defenders, signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances and established a commission of inquiry into enforced disappearances.

This commission documented around 1,700 complaints and found evidence of systematic use of enforced disappearances to target political opponents and activists, with direct complicity by Hasina and senior officials. In October, the Bangladesh International Crimes Tribunal issued arrest warrants for Hasina and 44 others for massacres during the 2024 protests, although the tribunal has a troubled history and retains the death penalty, contrary to international norms.

The Constitution Reform Commission has proposed expanding fundamental rights, with a bicameral parliament and term limits for top offices. However, the process has been undermined by the exclusion of major political players – most notably the AL – and minority groups.

Political tensions escalated as the interim government faced mounting pressure to set a general election date. Opposition parties accused it of deliberate stalling. The army chief publicly demanded elections by the end of 2025, while student groups sought postponement until reforms and justice were secured. After initial uncertainty, the government announced the election would occur in April 2026.

The most dramatic escalation came in May, when the interim government banned all AL activities under the Anti-Terrorism Act following renewed protests. The Election Commission subsequently suspended the AL’s registration, effectively barring it from future elections and fundamentally altering Bangladesh’s political landscape.

Economic challenges compound these political difficulties. Bangladesh remains fragile after devastating floods in 2024, while the banking sector faces stress from surging non-performing loans. Inflation continues outpacing wage growth and economic austerity measures agreed with the International Monetary Fund have sparked fresh protests.

Authoritarian patterns persist

Despite promises of change, old patterns of repression prove stubborn. Human rights groups document ongoing security forces abuses, including arbitrary arrests of opposition supporters and journalists, denial of due process and continued lack of accountability for past crimes. In the first two months of 2025 alone, over 1,000 police cases were filed against tens of thousands of people, mainly AL members or perceived supporters. A February crackdown on Hasina’s supporters led to over 1,300 arrests.

Press freedom remains severely threatened. In November, the interim government revoked the accreditation of 167 journalists. Around 140 journalists viewed as aligned with the previous regime have faced charges, with 25 accused of crimes against humanity, forcing many into hiding. Attacks on media outlets continue, including vandalism of newspaper offices.

The draft Cyber Protection Ordinance, intended to replace the repressive Cyber Security Act, has drawn criticism for retaining vague provisions criminalising defamation and ‘hurting religious sentiments’ while granting authorities sweeping powers for warrantless searches. Rights groups warn this law could stifle dissent in the run-up to elections.

Uncertain path forward

Bangladesh’s journey demonstrates that democratic transitions are inherently difficult, nonlinear and deeply contested processes. Democracy isn’t a guaranteed outcome, but the chances improve when political leaders are genuinely committed to reform and inclusive dialogue, and political players, civil society and the public practise sustained vigilance.

While the interim government has achieved steps unthinkable under the previous regime, the persistence of arbitrary arrests, attacks on journalists and the exclusion of key political players suggests authoritarianism’s shadow still looms large.

The upcoming general election will provide a crucial test of whether Bangladesh can finally turn the page on authoritarianism. The answer lies in whether Bangladeshis across government, civil society and beyond are able to build something genuinely new. The stakes are high in a country where many have already sacrificed much for the promise of democratic freedom.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

For interviews or more information, please contact [email protected]

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By Praise Nutakor
NEW YORK, Jul 7 2025 – In Gabú, Guinea-Bissau, a grandmother named N’beta hesitated. Her six-month-old grandson, Seco, was healthy, so why give him medicine? But community health workers Jamilia and Amadu gently explained that the medicine wasn’t for illness, but for protection. It was part of a seasonal malaria chemoprevention campaign designed to protect children during the worst malaria transmission months — the rainy season.

“Now I understand it’s to keep him safe,” N’beta said, watching Seco become one of 250,000 children protected in 2024 with a simple but life-saving dose.

Malaria remains a deadly threat across Africa, especially for children under five. But with support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its partners are reaching the most vulnerable, particularly in hard-to-reach communities.

In Chad, 9.4 million mosquito nets were distributed using a fully digitalized system in 2023, protecting 3.5 million households. In Burundi, 1.3 million people were protected through indoor spraying in 2024. In Guinea-Bissau, malaria prevalence dropped by more than half in just three years from 2020-2023.

But malaria is only one of the threats.
In South Sudan, tuberculosis (TB) continues to claim lives, often undetected.

“Not everyone can read and interpret an X-ray report,” said Dr. Ofere Ohide, a Radiologist at Torit State Hospital. “But with new AI-assisted X-ray machines, even clinics without power or specialists can now detect TB early,” he says of the digital x-ray machines provided through the Global Fund support.

These innovations, combined with decentralized care and improved case notification, helped 92% of people with TB receive treatment in 2023, contributing to a 75% drop in TB-related deaths in South Sudan since 2015. Similarly, close to 20,000 people got cured of TB out of about 23,000 TB cases registered in 2023 representing 85% treatment success rate.

And then there’s HIV – a virus that once devastated entire generations.
In Zimbabwe, where AIDS once slashed life expectancy to 45 years, progress has been hard-won. One young woman, Princess, 17, a survivor of sexual abuse, found strength through a Global Fund-supported comprehensive sexuality education programme delivered by UNDP and partners.

“I reclaimed my voice and will use it to ensure justice for survivors of abuse,” she said, now dreaming of becoming a lawyer.

In Angola, 22-year-old Ana Alexandre became a peer educator after joining sessions on sexual and reproductive health. “I am no longer ashamed to talk about sexuality,” she shared. “My little sister can come to me and ask things… I answer normally and clearly.”

Since 2003, UNDP and the Global Fund have worked hand-in-hand with governments, civil society, and communities to end HIV, TB, and malaria, even in the most fragile settings. In Africa, countries supported by UNDP and the Global Fund include Angola, Burundi, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, São Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique, and South Sudan.

In 2023 alone:
1.5 million people received HIV treatment
44,000 people were treated for TB
13.1 million mosquito nets were distributed to prevent malaria

To all the partners of the Global Fund including the governments of Germany, France, Portugal, Japan, the UK, Canada, the EU, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands – thank you. Your support is not just saving lives. It is restoring dignity, hope, and the promise of a healthier, more prosperous, and secure future.

But the work is not done.
To protect every child like Seco, to empower every girl like Princess, and to reach every community still at risk, we must keep going. Continued investment, including in the Global Fund’s Eighth Replenishment, is essential to ensure health for all and end HIV, TB and malaria by 2030.

Praise Nutakor is Partnerships and Communications Specialist, UN Development Programme (UNDP)

IPS UN Bureau

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