By CIVICUS
Dec 26 2025 –  
CIVICUS discusses Generation Z-led protests in Bulgaria with Zahari Iankov, senior legal expert at the Bulgarian Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, a civil society organisation that advocates for participation and human rights.

Zahari Iankov

Bulgaria recently experienced its largest protests since the 1990s, driven largely by young people frustrated with corruption and institutional decay. What began as opposition to budget measures quickly escalated into broader demands for systemic change. The prime minister’s resignation has triggered Bulgaria’s seventh election since 2021, but whether this cycle of repeated elections will finally address fundamental questions about institutional integrity, informal power structures and the enduring influence of the oligarchy remains to be seen.

What sparked recent protests?

Bulgaria has been in a prolonged political crisis since 2020, when mass protests first erupted against corruption and state capture. Although they didn’t immediately lead to a resignation, these protests marked the beginning of a cycle of repeated elections and unstable governments. Since 2021, Bulgaria has held several parliamentary elections, and no political settlement has lasted.

The latest protests, which erupted on 1 December, have probably been the largest since the early 1990s, during Bulgaria’s transition from communism to democracy. They were initially sparked by a controversial 2026 budget that raised taxes to fund public sector wages, but while economic concerns played a role, the protests were primarily centres on values. People reacted to the fact that democratic rules were being openly disregarded and governance was increasingly being shaped by informal powers and personal interests.

Several incidents reinforced the perception that institutions were being systematically undermined. One symbolic moment was the treatment of student representatives during parliamentary debates about education, including proposals for mandatory religious education. Members of parliament publicly shamed student council representatives, which many people saw as emblematic of a broader contempt for citizen participation and government accountability.

Other cases reinforced this perception: environmental laws were weakened without debate, key oversight bodies were left inactive for over a year and proposals that threatened freedom of expression were introduced, and only withdrawn following public backlash. Together, these incidents created a sense that institutions were being hollowed out.

The budget acted as a trigger, but public anger had been building for months. Throughout the government’s short mandate, there was a clear pattern of sidelining public participation and bypassing parliamentary procedures. Laws were rushed through committees in seconds, major reforms were proposed without consultation and controversial decisions were taken at moments designed to avoid opposition.

What made these protests different from previous ones?

One striking difference was the speed and scale of the mobilisation. What began as a protest linked to budget concerns quickly turned into huge demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people. Estimates suggest that between 100,000 and 150,000 people gathered in Sofia, the capital, during the largest protest. For such a small country, this was impressive. Also unlike previous mobilisations, these protests spread well beyond Sofia to many cities across the country, something unusual for Bulgaria’s highly centralised political system.

Another important difference was the strong presence of young people, which led to the protests being described as Gen Z protests. While young people also played a role in big protest movements in 2013 and 2020, this time the generational identity was much more visible and explicitly embraced. Young people were central as communicators as well as participants. Social media campaigns, humour and memes played a significant role in spreading information and mobilising support.

Additionally, these protests were not driven by a single political party. Although one party provided logistical support in Sofia, the extent of participation and the geographic spread made clear this was a broad social mobilisation, not a partisan campaign.

What role did organised civil society groups play in sustaining the protests?

There were a couple of civil society groups that were involved in the organisation of protests, but organised civil society’s main role was not in mobilising but in providing crucial long-term support. For years, civil society groups and investigative journalists have documented corruption, challenged harmful laws and mobilised public awareness around environmental and rule-of-law issues.

As traditional media came under increasing control, civil society helped fill the gap by exposing abuses and explaining complex issues in accessible ways. This helped counter the narrative that ‘nothing ever changes’ and empowered people to believe protest could make a difference.

At the same time, attempts by politicians to discredit or intimidate civil society organisations, including proposals resembling laws to stigmatise civil society as foreign agent, underscored how influential civil society has become.

Who are the figures at the centre of public anger, and what do they represent?

The two key figures are Boyko Borissov and Delyan Peevski, who represent two different but deeply entrenched forms of political power. A former mayor of Sofia and prime minister who has dominated Bulgarian politics for over a decade, Borissov retains a loyal voter base despite major scandals, and has repeatedly returned to power through elections. He built his image on strongman rhetoric and visible policing actions.

Peevski is a different figure. Sanctioned under the Magnitsky Act — a US law targeting people involved in corruption and human rights abuses — he has never enjoyed broad public support but wields enormous informal influence. Despite leading a political party, he operates largely behind the scenes. Over the years, he has been linked to deep penetration of the judiciary, influence over regulatory bodies and media control. His role in governance has become increasingly visible despite his party not formally being part of the ruling coalition.

Together, these two figures embody what protesters see as the fundamental problem: a ‘mafia-style’ system of governance, where access, decision-making and protection depend on proximity to powerful individuals rather than transparent institutional processes.

Does the government’s resignation address the underlying problems?

This was a political response, but it does not resolve the structural issues that triggered the protests. Bulgaria’s institutions remain weak, key oversight bodies continue operating with expired mandates and the judiciary continues to face serious credibility problems.

What happens next will depend largely on voter participation and political renewal. Turnout in recent elections has fallen below 40 per cent, undermining any legitimacy claims and making vote-buying and clientelism easier. Mass turnout would significantly reduce the influence of these practices and could be our only hope for real change.

However, lasting change will require action to restore institutional independence, reform the judiciary and ensure regulatory bodies function properly. Otherwise, any new government risks being undermined by the same informal power structures that brought people out onto the streets.

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SEE ALSO
Anti-euro protests continue; arrest of Varna mayor sparks protests CIVICUS Monitor 28.Jul.2025
Unprecedented protests in Bulgaria’s public media CIVICUS Monitor 27.May.2025
Bulgaria: stuck in a loop? CIVICUS Lens 24.Oct.2022

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By Mandeep S.Tiwana
NEW YORK, Dec 24 2025 – 2025 has been a terrible year for democracy. Just over 7 per cent of the world’s population now live in places where the rights to organise, protest and speak out are generally respected, according to the CIVICUS Monitor, a civil society research partnership that measures civic freedoms around the world. This is a sharp drop from over 14 per cent this time last year.

Civic freedoms underpin healthy democracies, and the consequences of this stifling of civil society are apparent. At the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, the world is experiencing 19th century levels of economic inequality. The wealth of the richest 1 per cent is surging while some 8 per cent of the world’s population – over 670 million people – suffer from chronic hunger. Weapons-producing firms, closely intertwined with political elites, are reaping windfall profits as death and destruction rains down in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan, Ukraine and many other places. It should surprise no one that the political leaders fomenting these conflicts are also squashing civic freedoms to avert questions about their motivations.

From Lima to Los Angeles, Belgrade to Dar es Salaam and Jenin to Jakarta, far too many people are being denied the agency to shape the decisions that impact their lives. Yet these places have also been the site of significant protests against governments this year. Even as authoritarianism appears to be on the march, people are continuing to pour onto the streets to insist on their freedoms. As we speak people in Sofia in Bulgaria are demonstrating in large numbers against endemic corruption which recently forced the government to resign.

History shows that mass demonstrations can lead to major advances. In the 20th century, people’s mobilisations helped achieve women’s right to vote, liberation of colonised peoples and adoption of civil rights legislation to address race-based discrimination. In the 21st century, advances have been made in marriage equality and other LGBTQI+ rights, and in highlighting the climate crisis and economic inequality through protests. But in 2025, the right to protest, precisely because it can be effective, is under assault by authoritarian leaders. Around the world, the detention of protesters is the number one recorded violation of civic freedoms, closely followed by arbitrary detentions of journalists and human rights defenders who expose corruption and rights violations.

This backsliding is now happening in major established democracies. This year, the CIVICUS Monitor downgraded Argentina, France, Germany, Italy and the USA to an ‘obstructed’ civic space rating, meaning the authorities impose significant constraints on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights. This regression is being driven by anti-rights nationalist and populist forces determined to degrade constitutional checks and balances and advance ballot box majoritarianism that denies minorities a fair say in economic, political and social life.

The push to degrade democracy by anti-rights forces now coming to fruition has been many years in the making. It accelerated this year with the return of Donald Trump. His administration immediately withdrew support to international democracy support programmes and instead built links to politicians responsible for crushing civic freedoms and committing grotesque human rights violations. Trump has laid out of the red carpet to El-Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Hungary’s Victor Orbán, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, ushering in a new era of values-free might-is-right diplomacy that threatens to undermine decades of painstaking progress achieved by civil society.

The fallout is clear. Many wealthy democratic governments that traditionally fund civil society activities have significantly reduced their contributions. At the same time, they have linked their remaining support for civil society to narrowly defined strategic military and economic interests. In doing so, they have played directly into the hands of powerful authoritarian states such as China, Egypt, Iran, Nicaragua and Venezuela that seek to discredit domestic calls for accountability. Countries including Ecuador and Zimbabwe have introduced laws to limit the ability of civil society organisations to receive international funding.

All these developments are negatively impacting on civil society efforts for equality, peace and social justice. Yet the story of 2025 is also one of persistent resistance, and some successes. The courage demonstrated by Generation Z protesters has inspired people around the world. In Nepal, protests triggered by a social media ban led to the fall of the government, offering hope for a much-needed political reset. In Kenya, young protesters continued to take to the streets to demand political reform despite state violence. In Moldova, a cash-rich disinformation campaign run by a fugitive oligarch failed to sway the course of the national election away from human rights values. In the USA, the number of people joining the No-Kings protests just keeps on growing.

With over 90 per cent of the world’s population living with the institutional denial of full civic freedoms, anti-rights forces must be feeling pretty smug right now. But democratic dissent is brewing, particularly among Generation Z, denied political and economic opportunities but understanding that another world – one more equal, just, peaceful and environmentally sustainable – is possible. It’s far from game over yet, and even in difficult times, people will demand freedoms – and breakthroughs may be just around the corner.

Mandeep S Tiwana is Secretary General of CIVICUS, the global civil society alliance.

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