By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Apr 29 2026 – The escalating global climate crisis has led to an increase in the frequency of climate-induced natural disasters, affecting millions worldwide. As governments struggle to keep up due to persistent funding shortfalls and inadequate preparedness and response mechanisms, education systems in Eastern and Southern Africa continue to deteriorate, pushing millions of children into displacement and poverty, further deepening long-term inequalities.

These are detailed out in a April 20 policy brief from UNICEF and global consulting firm Dalberg, titled Protecting Children’s Learning Futures: Quantifying Climate-Related Loss and Damage in Eastern and Southern Africa. The report analyses data from Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia, examining how increasingly destructive climate shocks are destroying educational infrastructure and limiting growth opportunities for the most vulnerable populations, including girls, children with disabilities, and other marginalised communities.

Through this report, UNICEF and Dalberg stress the urgency of building climate-resilient educational systems that promote human development, economic growth, and long-term self-sufficiency. Without immediate humanitarian intervention, it is projected that hundreds of millions of children are at risk of falling behind in their education by 2050, resulting in billions of dollars lost in development and poorer life outcomes.

“Children are paying the highest price for a crisis they did not create. For the first time, this report shows the scale of climate-related loss and damage to education, yet the impact on children remains largely invisible in financing decisions,” said Etleva Kadilli, UNICEF Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa.

“Without stronger prioritization in climate finance, education will continue to bear the brunt of climate impacts, driving repeated disruption,” Kadilli continued. “We must design education systems that anticipate shocks, protect early and foundational learning, and keep schools open. Otherwise, the true cost of climate loss and damage will be measured in lost human potential.”

Eastern and Southern Africa are among the most climate-sensitive regions in the world, home to roughly one-third of the world’s most vulnerable countries. According to UNICEF, since 2005 the region has experienced over 700 extreme weather events, roughly 75 percent of which are attributed to climate change, affecting over 330 million people and causing over 40,000 deaths.

As of 2024, climate-induced natural disasters have caused approximately USD 1.3 billion in damages, largely driven by widespread damage to school infrastructure and expenses related to establishing temporary learning facilities. Since 2005, extreme weather patterns have disrupted the education of over 130 million children, resulting in a total estimated loss of USD 120–140 billion in future earnings.

Without urgent intervention, UNICEF projects that these losses could rise to between USD 3.3 and 3.8 billion by 2050, nearly tripling in the most vulnerable contexts. This is equivalent to approximately 440 to 520 million students being stripped of their education, with projected losses in future earnings reaching between USD 260 to 380 billion.

Additionally, persistent climate shocks in Eastern and Southern Africa have been linked to declining school performance, compromised safety, and reduced well-being among school-aged children. According to the report, widespread heatwaves are associated with reduced cognitive performance, lower test scores, and diminished teaching performances among educators.

UNICEF has also reported rising rates of absenteeism and increasing psychosocial challenges, driven by the destruction of schools and the loss of supportive social networks. Schools themselves have become increasingly dangerous for both students and teachers, as damaged infrastructure and heat stress further limit access to safe, equitable, and quality education.

“Many people in the climate movement assume that people who are impacted by climate change are more worried about it, but that is not the case, including in frontline communities,” said Jennifer Carman, Director of Survey Strategy at the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC) at the Yale School of Environment. “Instead, people in frontline communities are more worried about hazards that directly affect their day-to-day lives, like extreme heat and power outages — and these hazards are made worse by climate change.”

Such daily struggles faced by children as a result of climate-driven disruptions to schooling manifest in heightened protection risks. A significant portion of school-aged children in these regions have been forced to relocate multiple times, essentially eliminating their access to structures of supervision, stability, and peer support. Additionally, the climate crisis continues to erode livelihoods, intensifying economic instability across many communities, and elevating children’s vulnerability to exploitation, including rising rates of child marriage, child labour, gender-based violence, and recruitment by armed coalitions.

These risks disproportionately affect girls, children with disabilities, and displaced communities. Despite this, as of 2023 estimates, less than 2.4 percent of funding from critical multilateral funds was allocated toward “child-responsive interventions”, while support for education-specific programs has remained minimal. This is relatively low when compared to national spending for other sectors, such as healthcare. UNICEF estimates that if education programs received adequate support, it could close the USD 97 billion funding gap that is needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 targets in low- and middle-income countries.

“Without systematically integrating education into climate finance and policy frameworks – including efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage – countries risk remaining trapped in repeated cycles of disaster recovery spending rather than sustained resilience building, allowing climate shocks to compound disruptions to learning and generate significant non-economic losses for children and their future opportunities,” the report states.

Figures from UNICEF show that investing in education can yield substantial returns, with every USD 1 invested generating $2 to $13 in avoided losses. With the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) Board meeting in Livingstone, Zambia, from April 22 to 24, humanitarian organizations and world leaders are aiming to broaden global conversations that are essential in shaping recovery and resilience efforts that could build a brighter future for children in these regions.

Through such dialogues, UNICEF urges governments, stakeholders, and donors to strengthen the integration of education within national climate frameworks, which can be done by explicitly referencing education in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to unlock access to “climate and loss-and-damage financing”.

UNICEF also advocates applying a climate-risk lens to domestic education financing, which could help ensure that budget allocations to education sectors are climate-informed and adequately support children’s foundational education and the continuation of their education in the long term.

Furthermore, UNICEF stresses the importance of scaling and better targeting international climate finance for education by encouraging major funding mechanisms to allocate resources for education. FRLD is one such example, financially supporting “unavoidable losses” when education systems are not adequately structured to withstand climate shocks.

“These frameworks should therefore clearly articulate how countries will protect education systems from climate-related loss and damage and strengthen learning continuity, enabling governments to align financing from multiple sources – including climate funds and private sector investment – toward sustained and risk-informed education investments that strengthen education systems and reduce future climate-related impacts,” the report states. “Such investments today can help break this cycle by safeguarding learning, reducing future fiscal pressures and protecting children’s development on which long-term human development depends.”

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By Sebastian Sons
BONN, Germany, Apr 29 2026 – While the world watches the Strait of Hormuz and the discord in negotiations between Iran and the United States, the role of the Gulf states is fading into the background. Iran’s attacks on the Arab Gulf states have triggered a threefold shock.

First, their business model – built on free trade routes, logistics, energy, tourism and entertainment – is under strain. Second, they are losing the confidence of international investors as safe havens, undermining their narrative as a reliable bulwark against the chaos in their neighbourhood. And lastly, their strategy of shielding themselves from external threats through comprehensive diplomacy, de-escalation and dialogue is at stake.

Influential mediators such as Qatar and Oman have come into the crosshairs of the war, as has Saudi Arabia, which only in 2023 resumed relations with Iran precisely to prevent such a scenario of regional escalation. This threefold shock is now forcing all Gulf states to rethink their security architecture in order to better protect themselves in the future.

Contrasting strategies

At present, it appears as though each ruler in the Gulf is pursuing their own strategy, relying on their own instruments and forging their own alliances. This is particularly evident in the case of the Gulf heavyweights Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The Saudi kingdom sees itself more as an actor committed to de-escalation, coordinating closely with regional players such as Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan.

Despite considerable frustration with the Islamic Republic, which has torpedoed any rapprochement in recent weeks, diplomatic relations with Tehran have not been severed. Instead, Riyadh recognises that some form of modus operandi with Iran will remain necessary.

The UAE, by contrast, has sharpened its rhetoric towards Iran in recent weeks, is increasingly adopting a confrontational stance and emphasises that Israel and the United States will assume an even more dominant role in the region after the war.

These differing positions point to deep-seated divergences between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, which had already become apparent before the war. In Yemen, the rivalry between the two regional powers escalated in December, culminating in Saudi Arabia publicly criticising its Emirati ‘brother’ and taking military action against its local partner, the Southern Transitional Council.

In Sudan, both governments support opposing sides – the UAE backs the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Saudi Arabia supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – further fuelling the humanitarian catastrophe three years into the bloody civil war.

The Gulf states are not striving for pure harmony, but rather pursuing similar interests through different instruments.

The two states also pursue contrasting strategies towards Israel. While the UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 and continues to maintain diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as an active defender of the Palestinian cause since Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and rejects any normalisation of relations with Israel.

These differing positions also reverberate beyond the region. Saudi Arabia, for example, criticised Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, where the UAE operates an important port — another illustration of the growing divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Two rival axes thus appear to have emerged, further consolidated by the current war. On one side stands Saudi Arabia as the representative of a more restrained approach to regional policy, working with partners such as Oman, Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey to pursue assertive diplomacy.

On the other side, the UAE – particularly the powerful emirate of Abu Dhabi – has adopted a policy of interventionist strength against Iran and Islamist movements, a stance that is supported in varying degrees by Kuwait and Bahrain. Along these axes, a regional arms race could intensify, economic rivalry could grow, and hyper-nationalism could deepen, leading to further hardening and polarisation of positions across the Gulf.

Yet this seemingly irreconcilable confrontation overlooks the fact that the Gulf states are not striving for pure harmony, but rather pursuing similar interests through different instruments. Their approach is based on a pragmatic both-and strategy that relies on flexible alliances to achieve their objectives. In fact, their goals are not as divergent as often assumed, but can be summarised as three core priorities: preserving national legitimacy, maintaining regional stability and safeguarding economic development.

These are all threatened by the war, creating a natural interest among the Gulf states in avoiding lasting harm to one another — or even outright conflict.

Competition does not preclude cooperation

The Gulf states have a long and shifting history of conflict and rapprochement. Disputes over borders, rivalries between ruling dynasties and families, conflicts over resources and trade routes, and competing approaches to developing their oil- and gas-dependent economies have repeatedly led to periods of defamation, demonisation and disintegration.

Most recently, the so-called Gulf crisis from 2017 to 2021 shook Gulf unity, when the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt imposed an air, sea and land blockade on Qatar. Despite these cycles of tension and reconciliation, the Gulf states have proven remarkably resilient, not least because of their ability to adapt flexibly to new challenges.

They must now demonstrate this capacity more than ever. The current war represents a pivotal moment in Gulf history, redefining how their both-and strategy can remain effective. To ensure this, they may increasingly rely on comprehensive deterrence, flexible alliances and diplomacy, which could lead to closer cooperation in certain policy areas.

This may include enhanced military cooperation, aimed at strengthening national security through regional defence capabilities and reducing dependence on the United States.

The development of a joint drone programme and protection against attacks on maritime security, desalination plants and future technologies are in the interests of all Gulf states — despite their differences in dealing with Iran. The same applies to other areas.

The war, through the sinking of tankers and the deployment of mines in the Persian Gulf, could seriously endanger an already fragile environment. Environmental disasters such as oil spills must therefore be prevented, which can only be achieved through collective action.

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has made it abundantly clear to most Gulf states how dependent they are on this sensitive maritime chokepoint for their energy exports.

The impact on the collective psyche of Gulf societies should not be underestimated either. Addressing this will require joint efforts in trauma recovery. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has made it abundantly clear to most Gulf states how dependent they are on this sensitive maritime chokepoint for their energy exports.

Alternatives are scarce, benefiting primarily Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait are being cut off from international maritime trade. Alternative trade routes are therefore essential, but can only be developed through partnership.

Plans for such routes have existed for years and could gain renewed momentum in the context of the crisis — whether in energy, transport or the construction of a Gulf railway network. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is planning new logistics corridors with Egypt and Jordan to enhance its independence.

At present, all Gulf states are suffering from declining revenues from oil and gas sales, tourism and financial services. Overall, economic growth in the region is projected to fall in 2026 from an expected 3.7 per cent to just 1.4 per cent. In Qatar, economic output could shrink by as much as 13 per cent, in the UAE by 8 per cent and in Saudi Arabia by 6.6 per cent.

This will likely lead all Gulf states to invest more cautiously and more selectively — particularly at home. The more they channel their reduced funds domestically, the fewer resources will be available for the urgently needed reconstruction in regional crisis zones such as Syria.

Here too, closer coordination in development cooperation could prove beneficial, as was the case during the Gulf crisis within the framework of the Arab Coordination Group, which brings together the development funds of all Gulf states alongside regional donor organisations such as the Islamic Development Bank.

These examples demonstrate that competition does not necessarily preclude cooperation, but rather depends heavily on context. The existing divergences among the Gulf states should therefore not be seen as set in stone, but as part of a complex process of negotiation and adaptation in times of crisis.

Alliances are shifting, leading to profound transformations that are particularly affecting the Gulf states. They will not abandon their both-and approach, but will recalibrate it. Whether they act against or alongside one another will depend more than ever on circumstances and the instruments they choose — resulting in a dynamic that could combine partnership with simultaneous polarisation.

Dr Sebastian Sons is a scientist at the CARPO research institute and conducts research primarily on the economic, foreign, social, development and sports policy of the Arab Gulf monarchies.

Source: International Politics and Society. Brussels

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By Mihaela Siritanu
LONDON, Apr 29 2026 – As the United States and Israel’s 2026 attack on Iran remains on pause, most eyes have fixed on oil. Tankers reroute around the Strait of Hormuz, oil benchmarks climb, and insurance costs spike. But while the headlines focus on energy, warning signs are already flashing from the food commodities markets.

Middle East tensions continue to escalate, but global wheat and maize supplies remain relatively well stocked and production has not been significantly disrupted. Yet UK wheat futures have risen to almost £183 per tonne — their highest level since mid-November — after rising more than £2.60 in a single week. At the same time, fertiliser prices — a key input for future harvests — have doubled since the start of the year, even though the main impacts on crop production have yet to materialise.

These are early warning signs — not of a harvest failure, but of how today’s food system responds to crisis. Food prices are beginning to rise, with the FAO Food Price Index steadily increasing in February and March 2026, even though crops have not yet failed, harvests have not collapsed, and global production remains broadly stable. The crisis is unfolding in real time, before any physical shortage has fully materialised.

Of course, real factors matter — but they operate very differently. When oil prices rise, they feed into food production through higher fertiliser costs, more expensive transport, and increased energy use on farms.

But these are gradual pressures: they work their way through the system over months, as farmers purchase inputs, plant crops, and bring harvests to market. Prices linked to these costs would normally rise slowly, in step with actual changes in production.

Instead, prices are moving immediately, driven less by current shortages than by expectations of what might happen. Markets anticipate future disruptions and push prices up faster than underlying conditions would justify. In this system, financial markets are no longer simply reflecting reality — they are actively reshaping it.

Over recent decades, agricultural commodities have been transformed from goods into financial assets. Wheat, maize, and rice are now traded not only by farmers and merchants, but by hedge funds, investment banks, and institutional investors seeking returns.

In wealthier countries, higher food prices squeeze household budgets. In much of the Global South, where food accounts for a larger share of income, the same increases can push families into hunger. Import-dependent countries must pay prices set on global markets even when local supply conditions remain stable

Financial instruments such as commodity index funds channel large volumes of capital into these markets, often detached from real supply and demand. Large trading firms straddle both physical and financial markets, allowing them to profit from volatility, rather than mitigate it.

When geopolitical shocks occur, this capital moves quickly. Investors position themselves ahead of expected disruptions, driving up futures prices that then feed through to importers, retailers, and consumers. The Iran crisis is therefore not just raising costs, it is activating a financial system primed to amplify them.

The consequences are global but uneven. In wealthier countries, higher food prices squeeze household budgets. In much of the Global South, where food accounts for a larger share of income, the same increases can push families into hunger. Import-dependent countries must pay prices set on global markets even when local supply conditions remain stable.

These pressures do not remain purely economic. Food price spikes can have destabilising political effects. Rising costs of staple foods have long been linked to social unrest, including in the lead-up to the Arab Spring, when increases in bread prices contributed to protests across North Africa and the Middle East. This reflects a broader pattern in which rising food costs – amplified by market speculation – increase the likelihood of unrest by intensifying existing social and economic grievances.

This helps explain a persistent paradox: hunger continues to rise in a world that produces more than enough food. The problem is not simply production, but access – and increasingly, how prices are formed.

That system was built over decades: on one hand through the deregulation of commodity markets in the Global North, which opened the door to large-scale speculative investment, and on the other, deregulation exported globally through IMF and World Bank programmes that promoted market liberalisation, privatisation, and the dismantling of public price stabilisation mechanisms, leaving many countries exposed to volatility.

The emerging food price pressures linked to the Iran conflict should therefore be understood as more than a temporary shock. They are a warning signal. If prices can spike before shortages occur, then food insecurity is no longer just a matter of supply. It is a function of how markets are organised.

Until that system is addressed, each new geopolitical crisis — whether in Iran or elsewhere — will continue to reverberate through food markets in ways that deepen inequality and intensify hunger. The next food crisis is not just growing in the fields. It is already being priced in.

Mihaela Siritanu is a political economist for the Bretton Woods Project

By Catherine Wilson
SYDNEY, Australia, Apr 29 2026 – It is an invisible contaminant that has been found in fisheries, an essential part of the food chain for many Pacific Islanders. Mercury, emitted from fossil fuel power generation and other industrial processes around the world, has now penetrated marine ecosystems in the Pacific Islands with detrimental consequences for people’s health and wellbeing.

But island states, supported by scientific expertise at the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and funding by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the world’s largest multilateral fund  for the environment, are implementing the action needed. The Mercury Free Pacific campaign is forging progress to protect islanders and their natural habitats from poisoning.

“Our communities face mercury risks from two main sources: what we eat, fish, and what we use in our homes and workplaces,” Emelipelesa Sam Panapa, Chemical Management Officer at the Department of Environment in the Polynesian atoll island nation of Tuvalu, told IPS. “Fish is the most widespread and challenging risk. It is not just food; it is central to our culture, livelihood and food security.”

The Mercury Free Pacific Campaign has brought together Pacific Island nations and the expertise of the SPREP and UNEP and been made possible with funding by the GEF. Credit: GEF

Mercury is a natural element in the Earth that has been released into the atmosphere for millennia through volcanic events and rock erosion. But human-generated, mostly industrial, processes have accelerated the build-up of mercury emissions. Metal processing facilities, cement works, the production of vinyl monomer and coal-fired power stations are the biggest contributors to the high levels of mercury in the atmosphere today.

From 2010 to 2015 alone, global anthropogenic mercury emissions rose by 20 percent, reports the UNEP. Coal-burning processes account for about 21 percent of all emissions. And this is projected to increase if a further 1,600 planned coal-driven power stations, on top of the existing 3,700 worldwide, are built. Already mercury in the atmosphere is about 450 percent above natural levels, reports UNEP.

After travelling long distances, mercury emissions then deposit in oceans. And toxicity begins when natural bacteria in aquatic environments mix with mercury, transforming it into Methylmercury, which is a neurotoxin. In the Pacific region, Methylmercury has contaminated beaches, coral reefs and fisheries, including swordfish, shark, tuna and mackerel, that are commonly consumed daily. Seafood is an important source of protein for up to 90 percent of Pacific Islanders and contributes to cash-based livelihoods for about 50 percent, reports the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

Today mercury is named one of the top ten chemicals of concern to public health by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the danger is especially acute in women and children. It can, in higher doses, inflict damage on cardiovascular organs, kidneys and the nervous systems of pregnant women and subsequently affect organ development of the foetus.

A fisherman on the coast of Funafuti, Tuvalu, throwing a weighted net out into the seawater, a traditional form of fishing. Credit: Rodney Dekker / Climate Visuals

The results of a medical study conducted by the Biodiversity Research Institute (BRI) confirmed health concerns.  Testing for traces of mercury in 757 women, aged 18-44 years, in the developing island states of the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Oceans, including the Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Tonga and Marshall Islands, revealed that 58 percent possessed a level in their bodies that exceeded the safe threshold of 1ppm Hg. Researchers concluded the most likely cause was the high consumption of contaminated fish. In comparison, women who consumed lower amounts of fish and seafood recorded the lowest levels of mercury.

However, islanders also encounter toxicity in their households. Mercury is used in the production of common imported consumer products, such as fluorescent light tubes, electrical switches, dental amalgam fillings and skin lightening cosmetics. But it is when these products reach the end of their lives and are discarded that mercury is at risk of lingering indefinitely in the environment.

“The core of the problem is that mercury-added products are not being separated from municipal solid waste, and there are no local facilities for the environmentally sound disposal of mercury waste,” Soseala Tinilau, SPREP’s Hazardous Waste Management Advisor, told IPS. Also, “medical waste incineration sites are identified as potential sources of mercury emissions to the air.” And in some locations, raw sewerage flows have contributed mercury waste due to affected products being washed down drains into waterways and the sea.

A challenge is that waste management systems in many Pacific Island countries are constrained by lack of capacity, technology, resources and infrastructure. “There are no local facilities for the environmentally sound disposal of mercury waste. Therefore, a system for packing, exporting and disposing of this waste in an approved facility abroad is a critical need,” Tinilau specified.

Fisheries, susceptible to mercury contamination, are a major source of food and protein for Pacific Islanders. Fish market, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Credit: Catherine Wilson/IPS

Several years ago, numerous Pacific Island states, including Kiribati, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, joined the Minamata Convention. The first global agreement to reform the ways in which mercury is used, phase it out in industries and develop better waste management practices, among other measures, came into effect in 2017.

Now governments in the region are drawing further on the power of multilateral collaboration in the Mercury Free Pacific initiative. The expansive mandate of the GEF-funded project includes conducting national surveys of mercury contamination, educating local communities about the risks, reviewing exposure to mercury-added consumer products, reforming waste management practices and assisting governments to develop relevant legislation.

The GEF is funding US$12.6 billion in environmental projects currently underway globally, which are expected to generate a further US$80.5 billion in co-financing. And it has a long view of its commitment to the Mercury Free Pacific project through its GEF Islands program, with goals outlined until at least 2030.

Anil Bruce Sookdeo, the GEF’s coordinator for Chemicals and Waste, elaborated that in the Pacific the GEF has provided US$1.5 million for gathering mapping data, its analysis and developing action and remedial plans in eleven Pacific Island nations, including the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

A further US$2 million is allocated to supporting national responses, such as devising effective legislation, community awareness programs and improving waste management processes. The campaign “represents a long-term regional objective, rather than a time-based project and requires sustained commitment and coordinated action by Pacific countries, regional institutions and partners,” he emphasised.

GEF funding has empowered Tuvalu, a country comprising nine coral islands and 11,800 people in the South Pacific, to make strides in its whole-of-society response to the issue.  The government has been able to strengthen its capacity and expertise, organise media awareness campaigns and oversee consultation with industries, communities and civil society organisations.

“For the first time, we have a national estimate of where mercury is coming from…we are beginning to understand the risks to our people and we have a roadmap for future action,” Panapa said in outlining the benefits of the Mercury Free Pacific initiative. At the same time, “these efforts represent the beginning of a longer journey to build community understanding and change behaviours related to mercury-added products, waste disposal and dietary choices.”

But a mitigation goal at the top of the list is to prevent mercury from reaching the islands. “Making marine life safe from mercury contamination is not about eliminating mercury already present in the ocean, but about preventing further contamination and managing the risk of exposure,” Tinilau said.

This means, among other measures, restricting the importation of mercury-added consumer products and galvanising global action to halt mercury emissions. Global consensus on phasing out coal-fired power stations and reforming industrial processes would be a start.

Pacific Island countries are demonstrating the political will and action with “regional coherence, national ownership and sustained momentum toward reducing mercury risks to human health, the environment and food systems in the Pacific,” emphasised Sookdeo from the GEF. Now, big emitters need to heed the urgency of reducing emissions at their source.

Notes: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.

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