By Francis Kokutse
Libreville, Oct 18 2022 – Over the past few years, Gabon has been successful in its forest conservation efforts. The country has also been able to work hard to achieve the goal of limiting the rise in global temperatures to the 1.5-degree target. Minister of Water, Forests, the Sea, and Environment, Lee White, talks to IPS Correspondent Francis Kokutse:

IPS: Gabon is being touted for its success story in forest conservation. When did this begin, and what are the results so far?

Minister Lee White (LW): In 1972, the late President Omar Bongo went to Stockholm for the first major political summit on the environment. On his return, he created a Ministry of Environment. After Rio in 1992. He signed Gabon’s first environmental law in 1993 and initiated a review that led to the new forestry law in 2001 – which made sustainable forestry obligatory. In 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Rio plus 10, he announced the creation of 13 National Parks covering 11% of Gabon. This led to the National Parks Law of 2007, which created the National Parks Agency (ANPN). In 2006/ 2007, he also created six Ramsar (wetland) sites.

In 2009, President Ali Bongo Ondimba was elected on a Gabon Green – Gabon Industrial – Services Gabon – platform: a sustainable development manifesto. He further developed his collaboration with the Prince of Wales (now King Charles III) and attended the climate COP in Copenhagen, where he represented forestry in Africa in the small group of 20 Heads of State and Government who wrote the Copenhagen Agreement. He subsequently strengthened ANPN, increasing staffing and budget levels ten times, created our Climate Council, the Climate Plan, the Plan Strategic Gabon Emergent (PSGE) sustainable economy plan, the Gabonese Agency for Space Studies and Observation (AGEOS) to monitor forests and 20 marine protected areas covering 27% of our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – extending our forest conservation and management model into the ocean. As a result, we have had five decades of deforestation below 0.1%/year (closer to 0.05%) and are the country net absorbing the most CO2, over 100 million tons annually.

IPS: The conservation efforts surely have some problems. What were these?

LW: Two types of problems – one is external – cross-border poaching, especially for ivory, by organised criminal groups; the same for illegal gold mining; illegal pirate fishing boats; illegal forestry – sometimes cross-border. So, this has to be fought with strong, motivated, professional armed rangers. Gabon has been successful – while forest elephant numbers across the region have fallen by 70%, in Gabon, they went from 60,000 in 1990 to 95,000 in 2020.

The other is internal: Human-elephant conflict (is complex, but basically, there are more elephants; poaching in remote forests drives them toward people, and climate change has resulted in less fruit in the rain forest, and even in parks (so) the elephants are thinner today than they were 30 years ago. (As a result) hungry elephants are leaving the forests to feed on crops. This is on the rise and erodes the support of the Gabonese people. Also, when the economy is tight, as it has been since 2015 – the Government is able to spend less money on the parks.

IPS: Gabon has benefitted from its efforts with increased Carbon Credits. What has this come to?

LW: We signed an agreement with Norway for results-based payments of up to 150 million US dollars, of which we have received 17 million US dollars to date. This is a modest amount of funding. But will allow us to better manage the forest and thereby generate more credits in the future. Just yesterday (October 3, 2022), we got notification from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of the validation of 187 million tons of REDD+ credits . . . which will be made official next week. All pre-Glasgow COP 26 REDD+. Carbon credits are voluntary, so there is a guarantee we will be able to sell them. We have a first offer to buy about 100,000 tons at $30 . . . so the real answer to your question is that we will see over the next 2-3 years what this will come to.

IPS: How will ordinary people benefit from all these efforts?

LW: My expectation is that in the post-Glasgow world, Gabon will generate 100 million tons of net sequestration carbon credits per year and sell them for a price of $20-30. These funds will be distributed as follows: 10% reinvested in forest management; 15% for rural communities; 25% for the Sovereign Fund to reinvest for future generations; 25% to service Gabon’s debt load; 25% in the national budget for education, health, and climate resilience . . . the funds will make our economy more viable and resilient and reduce our debt servicing payments making more money available for the Gabonese people.

IPS: Have these forest conservation efforts led to the relocation of ordinary people? If so, what was done to them?

LW: Never, no – this is not our policy. We have a small population – about 200 people – who live within the parks. We map out their traditional areas and formalize their rights in our park management plans.

IPS: The more you try to conserve the forest, the more you increase the animal population, is that not opening up the country to zoonotic diseases?

LW: No – the wildlife in the parks is in equilibrium – it is when you cut the forests and animals come into contact with people that there is a risk of cross infection – as a general rule, if nature is healthy, so are people.

IPS: Media reports say the country’s elephant population has increased dramatically. Has that also not affected farming, and what is the Government doing to save farms?

LW: I mentioned that human-elephant conflict is higher. This year we are investing about 10 million US dollars in compensation and building electric barriers to protect peoples’ crops.

IPS: With Gabon’s success so far, what is the country presenting at COP27?

LW: We will present our 187 million carbon credits to the world. We will also present our model of exploiting the forest in a sustainable manner to save the forests. In general terms, this is a Conference of Parties (COP), where negotiators are progressing. Not concluding negotiations – so the focus will be more on thematic issues.

IPS: How can other African countries learn from Gabon’s experience?

LW: I believe our forestry model – banning export to promote local jobs and the local economy can work for Congo Basin countries. Also, our national carbon accounting in different ecosystems could be applied in many African countries, not just rainforest countries, to create nature-based carbon credits in the future.

IPS: What has been the response from other countries in the Congo Basin on what Gabon is doing so far?

LW: Thus far, it is probably fair to say their response is a “wait and see” response – they are interested but not yet convinced it will work. That said, Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) countries have announced they will follow Gabon’s example and ban log exports from January 1, 2023.

What is the future of Gabon’s conservation effort?

LW: Time will tell. We are a member of the High Ambition for Nature and People Alliance, pushing for a global standard of 30% protected lands and oceans by 2030 – in Gabon, we are currently at 21% on land and 27% in the ocean.

It is my belief that if we can continue the transition in the forestry sector towards 3rd and 4th level transformation and if a global carbon market emerges to reward Gabon’s net carbon sequestration that the wise and sustainable use and conservation of natural resources in Gabon can become a sustainable model, such as is the case in Costa Rica.

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By Anis Chowdhury and Jomo Kwame Sundaram
SYDNEY and KUALA LUMPUR, Oct 18 2022 – Preoccupied with enhancing their own ‘credibility’ and reputations, central banks (CBs) are again driving the world economy into recession, financial turmoil and debt crises.

Wall Street ‘cred’
Most CB governors believe ‘credibility’ is desirable and must be achieved by fighting inflation at any cost. To justify their own more harmful policies, they warn inflation is ‘damaging’.

Anis Chowdhury

They argue CBs need ‘independence’ from governments to pursue ‘credible’ monetary policy. Inflation targeting to ‘anchor’ inflation expectations is supposed to generate desired ‘confidence’. But CBs have been responsible for many costly failures.

The US Fed deepened the 1930s’ Great Depression, the 1970s’ stagflation and the early 1980s’ contraction, besides contributing to the 2008-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Hence, CB notions of ‘credibility’ and ‘independence’ need to be reconsidered.

Milton Friedman – whom many central bankers revere – blamed the 1930s’ Great Depression on US Fed actions and inactions. Instead of providing liquidity support for businesses struggling with short-term cash-flow problems, it squeezed credit and economies.

But why did the Fed behave as it did? Some economic historians insist it was “to promote the interests of commercial banks, rather than economic recovery”.

Monetary policy before and during the Great Depression “was designed to cause the failure of non-member banks, which would enhance the long-run profits of the Fed’s member banks and enlarge the [Fed’s] regulatory domain”.

Others concluded, “Federal Reserve errors seem largely attributable to the continued use of flawed policies” to defend the ‘gold standard’, and its poor understanding of monetary conditions.

Central banks contractionary
Worse, few lessons were learnt. Instead of protecting the gold standard, or being counter-cyclical, fighting inflation is the new CB preoccupation. Even worse, most CBs now commit to an arbitrarily-set inflation target of 2%, first promoted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand over three decades ago.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

Major CB interventions have caused both economic booms or bubbles and busts or contractions, often without mitigating inflation. Such “go-stop” monetary policy swings have caused asset price bubbles and financial fragility besides sudden contractions.

Ben Bernanke’s research team found the major damage from the 1970s’ oil price shocks was due to the “tightening of monetary policy” response. Other research attributed the 1970s’ stagflation largely to the Fed’s “go-stop” monetary policy, worsened by policymakers’ “misperceptions” and “faulty doctrine”.

Hence, “in substantial part the Great Stagflation of the 1970s could have been avoided, had the Fed not permitted major monetary expansions in the early 1970s”.

Labour pays
Likewise, Fed chair Paul Volcker sharply raised interest rates during 1979-81 “to a crushing level of nearly 20 per cent by the middle of 1981”.

This precipitated the “ensuing recession that started in July 1981 [which] became the most severe downturn since the second world war”. US unemployment reached nearly 11% in late 1982, the highest since the Great Depression.

Volcker’s actions betrayed the Fed’s dual mandate to pursue both full employment and price stability. First in the Employment Act of 1946, it was re-codified in the 1978 ‘Humphrey-Hawkins’ Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act.

Eventually, the long-term unemployed “became invisible to both the labour market and to policymakers”. Many became deskilled as others fell victim to criminality, substance abuse, and mental illness, even suicide.

The overall health of Americans became “poorer for years as a result of the deep economic recession in 1981 and 1982”.

Sending Global South south
Volcker’s actions caused developing country debt crises, with decades lost in Latin America and Africa. A recent New York Times opinion-editorial warned, “The Powell pivot to tighter money in 2021 is the equivalent of Mr. Volcker’s 1981 move”, and “the 2020s economy could resemble the 1980s”.

Yet, invoking CB credibility, many with power and influence are urging the Fed to stick to its guns with Volcker’s “courage to take out the baseball bat to slam the economy and slay inflation”!

The World Bank warns of dire developing country debt crises following policy-induced recessions. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund has warned developing economies with dollar-denominated debt of imminent foreign exchange crises.

Stop-go new norm
Fed, Bank of England and European Central Bank policy approaches still justify “go-stop” monetary policy reversals. Resulting booms or bubbles and busts also feature in other recent crises, e.g., the GFC.

Following the 1997 East Asian financial crises, Mexican, Russian and post-US ‘dotcom bubble’ bust, the Fed eased monetary policy too much for too long during the ‘Great Moderation’.

CBs enabled credit expansion in the 2000s, culminating in the GFC. More worryingly, the “near-consensus view” is that independent CBs have failed to achieve – let alone protect – financial stability.

Easy credit and rising stock and housing markets have involved rapid credit and loan growth worsening asset price bubbles. Regulatory oversight became increasingly lax as investors ‘chased yield’. Leverage grew, using dodgy ‘derivative’ products, making proper risk assessment difficult.

Guy Debelle, once Deputy Governor of Australia’s CB, noted, “The goal of financial stability has generally been left vague”. Hence, CBs failed to see significant build-up of financial instability”. Soon after, the Lehman Brothers’ collapse precipitated the GFC.

QE magic from bubble to bust
Governments withdrew fiscal ‘stimuli’ too soon. So, major CBs aggressively pursued ‘unconventional monetary policies’, especially ‘quantitative easing’, to keep economies afloat.

Extraordinary monetary expansion provided vital liquidity, but poor coordination also fuelled asset price bubbles. Thus, unviable enterprises survived, undermining productivity growth.

With less investment in the real economy, supply capacity is falling behind still growing demand. Pandemic, war and sanctions have also disrupted supplies.

Raising interest rates, CBs now race to reverse earlier monetary expansion. Credit contractions are squeezing economies, hitting poorer countries especially hard.

Reviewing historical data, the author of the ‘Taylor rule’ – whom many CBs profess to follow – concluded, “The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that they are caused by excesses – frequently monetary excesses – which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust”.

Independence for what?
CB independence (CBI) advocates often claim low inflation during the Great Moderation was due to CB credibility. But inflation in most countries declined from the mid-1990s, with or without CBI.

The alleged causation has been much exaggerated, and is certainly not as strong as argued. Claiming CBI ensures low inflation also denies other relevant variables, e.g., labour market casualization and globalization.

Debelle observed, “How much [low inflation] can be attributable to central bank independence or the inflation target is difficult to disentangle …[Favourable] assessment mostly relies on assertion, rather than empirical proof”.

Milton Friedman argued crisis responses involve inherently political decisions, best not left to the unelected. A modern CB’s “responsibilities overlap with other government functions”. So, CBs must be subject to political authority while maintaining operational independence.

CBI fetishism has also allowed central bankers to ignore distributional consequences of monetary policies. This has often enabled financial asset owners, speculators and creditors. CBI has also meant neglecting development responsibilities.

Emphasizing CBI also implies “a very narrow view of central bank functions”. This has made economies more prone to financial instability and crisis. Clearly, CBI is no harmless ‘elixir’ ensuring low inflation.

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By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Oct 18 2022 – The recent conflict between the United States and Saudi Arabia over Riyadh’s decision to cut its oil production by 2 million barrels a day should be addressed in the context of their long and extensive relationship.

For more than 70 years, the two countries have cooperated and collaborated on many levels, including the massive sale of US military hardware, collaboration on national security, joint economic development, and transfer of sensitive US technology, along with intelligence sharing.

The current conflict is not the first that has occurred between the two countries; in fact, in 1973 the Saudis imposed an oil boycott on the US as retribution for its aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, and in 2001 after the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, relations became strained again due to (still unproven) allegations about the possible involvement of Saudi Arabia in the attack, as 15 of the 19 terrorists were Saudi citizens.

These two major incidents certainly disrupted the relationship to a great extent; nevertheless, each time they restored the spirit and the practical dimension of their relationship because their shared interests on so many levels overrode their conflicting positions. I believe that this recent conflict will not change, as with previous conflicts, their bilateral relationship in any fundamental way.

President Biden stated that “… when the House and the Senate comes back, there’s going to be some consequences for what [Saudi Arabia has] done with Russia.” Congressional Democrats went as far as demanding taking unprecedented countermeasures against Saudi Arabia, including the cessation of all aspects of cooperation with Riyadh.

What precipitated this stern reaction by Biden and leading Democrats is attributed to several factors. The Saudi action was seen as an affront to Biden personally, especially given his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, with the purpose of reducing the tension between the two countries and persuading the Saudis to increase oil production.

Riyadh’s action is further seen as a barefaced anti-American move and as collusion with Russia against the US. Moreover, Biden and many Democrats view the Saudis’ decision as one that would worsen global inflation and undermine US efforts to bring down the price of gas, especially now just before the mid-term elections, while helping Putin in his war against Ukraine.

To be sure, they feel that the Saudis are ungrateful and unworthy of the US’ consistent defense assistance, which leads them to conclude that the Saudis are no longer a reliable ally.

The Saudi action appears to be as if they are taking revenge against the US, specifically because Biden, from the time he was running for president, called Saudi Arabia a “pariah,” whose leadership had “very little redeeming value.”

He accused Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) of orchestrating the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and swore to never speak with him, and criticized the kingdom for its indiscriminate bombing in Yemen and its human rights violations. Finally, Saudi has been public in its opposition to Biden’s efforts to renew the Iran deal.

In a conversation I had a couple of days ago with David Rundell, former Chief of Mission in the American embassy in Riyadh, author of “Vision or Mirage,” and one of America’s foremost experts on Saudi Arabia, he emphasized that the conflict has a significant emotional component for the Saudis which the Biden administration failed to appreciate.

As Rundell stated, “The president did, I think that the only term you can use is insult, Mohammed bin Salman several times. He made it very clear that he did not like Mohammed bin Salman…The White House made it very clear that they were not going to see Mohammed bin Salman…Then the president refuses to shake his hand.”

Rundell further commented on the Saudis’ pride and independence which they hold high, and cautioned that “the Saudis acted in what they thought was their own self-interest. They will do so again. If the United States wants to try to isolate them or punish them, it will simply drive them closer to China and Russia, which is already happening.”

Although it is necessary to reevaluate the US-Saudi relationship in the wake of what happened, I concur with Rundell that it will be a mistake for the Biden administration to take any significant punitive measures against the Saudis which will only worsen their bilateral relationship at an extremely sensitive time. As Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated last year, the idea is “not to rupture the [US-Saudi] relationship, but to recalibrate [it].”

I believe that some Democratic senators, like Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, who said that he will propose a halt to “any cooperation with Riyadh until the Kingdom reassess its position with respect to the war in the Ukraine,” adding, “enough is enough,” and others, including Senator Richard Blumenthal and Rep. Ro Khanna who introduced a bill to “immediately pause all US arms sale to Saudi Arabia,” are going far beyond the pale of what needs to be done.

Other Democrats are calling for milder measures, including withholding intelligence, refusing the sale of certain weapons, restricting access to financial markets, and curtailing some elements of military training, along with slowing down major development projects.

This may seem necessary to send Saudi Arabia a message about the US’ displeasure, but it will be still the wrong message.

Indeed, given that both countries must take into full consideration the importance of their bilateral relationship and its overall regional security implications, they should not engage in a tit for tat which can only benefit Russia and China.

It should be noted that although Saudi Arabia depends on the US for much of its military hardware and national security guarantees, the Saudis feel that they have been all along reciprocating by helping to maintain regional stability, making considerable efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, joining hands with the US in fighting terrorism, and allowing the US to continue to have a military presence on their soil.

Furthermore, the Saudis have promoted a more tolerant version of Islam, and continue to trade oil with dollar, which strengthens the American currency.

The Saudis also fundamentally disagree with the US about their motivation to cut down their oil production. As they see it, their action was strictly motivated by business considerations.

They wanted to reduce oil production in order to increase prices, and insist that even with the cut of 2 million barrels a day, the price will remain in the vicinity of $80-90 per barrel of oil which is still far less than $130 per barrel, the high of the past few years.

The Saudis see it as a business decision, nothing to do with politics. Regardless of how disingenuous this may sound, there is a financial benefit which they can reap; it is the timing of the cut that troubled many American officials.

My position is that the Biden administration should not take any punitive counter-action against Saudi Arabia, certainly not before the midterm election, which allows for a cooling off period. Following that, the Biden administration should establish contact behind-the-scenes in an effort to mitigate their differences.

Given the critical importance of their bilateral relationship especially at this juncture, both sides must avoid any public recrimination which can only aggravate the relationship.

Indeed, the continuing discord between the US and Saudi Arabia will further encourage Russia and China to do everything they can to create a schism between the two allies, especially now when Biden has just declared that China and Russia are adversaries of the US.

This may sound like an appeasement of the Saudis, but it is not. Indeed, regardless of who is right and who is wrong—and in this case, both have their share of blame—any dispute between allies must be resolved through dialogue and honest discussion.

This is the time when Saudi Arabia and the US must demonstrate that given their long friendship and constructive relationship for more than seven decades, their alliance can and will stand the test of time.

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a retired professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University (NYU). He taught courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies for over 20 years.

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