By Andrew Firmin
LONDON, Apr 25 2024 – A group of senior Swiss women recently won a powerful victory offering renewed hope for tackling climate change. Earlier this month, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the government of Switzerland is violating human rights because it isn’t doing enough to cut greenhouse gas emissions.

Swiss women take the lead

More than 2,000 Swiss women with an average age of 73 backed the case, coming together in the KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz (Senior Women for Climate Protection Switzerland) group. They argued that their rights to family life and privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights are being breached because they’re particularly vulnerable to premature death due to extreme heat.

The evidence from Europe’s recent heatwaves is grim: over 70,000 people are estimated to have died as a result of high temperatures in 2022. Older people are more vulnerable to heatwaves, with women the worst hit. In Switzerland, older women had the highest level of deaths during the 2022 heatwave.

The favourable ruling is a landmark. While there’ve been several judgments in favour of climate action by national-level courts in recent years, this is the first time the European Court has ruled that lack of action on climate change violates human rights, and the first time any international human rights court has recognised that people have a right to be protected from climate change.

We welcome the European Court of Human Rights @ECHR_CEDH ruling in #KlimaSeniorinnen case v. #Switzerland affirming that States have human rights obligations to sufficiently mitigate #climate change. Ruling provides a basis for determined action & justice globally – @volker_turk pic.twitter.com/NlSLzVMD3b

— UN Human Rights (@UNHumanRights) April 9, 2024

It won’t be the last. At least six more climate cases await the European Court, including one brought against the Norwegian government by Greenpeace Nordic, arguing that plans to expand fossil fuel extraction in Arctic waters violate human rights. National-level courts may also draw on the European Court’s precedent. More litigation is sure to follow.

Growing field

The case was one of three the Court considered, and the only to succeed. Lawsuits brought by a group of young Portuguese people against 32 European states and by a French politician against France were both dismissed – but on procedural grounds, rather than on the merits of the cases. The one victory was a triumph for all, since everyone will benefit from the emissions cuts that should result.

In many climate court cases, young people are making the running, rightly arguing that climate change affects them disproportionately, since it impinges on the rights of their future selves. But the young Portuguese campaigners acknowledged the vital contribution their older Swiss counterparts have made, showing how vital solidarity between generations is for civil society struggles.

Climate campaigners are making growing use of litigation to hold governments and corporations to account for their failure to act on the climate crisis. Over 1,500 climate litigation cases have been filed since the Paris Agreement was reached in 2015, and more than half have had favourable outcomes. There’s a growing trend of climate litigants framing their cases around human rights agreements they argue are being breached when governments and corporations don’t take adequate action.

Among recent successes, last November the Brussels Court of Appeal imposed a binding emissions cut target on Belgian authorities following a human rights lawsuit. That same month, a German court ruled that the government must immediately adopt an action programme on emissions targets for construction and transport. In August 2023, 16 young activists won a case in Montana, USA, with the court ruling that the state government’s policies in support of fossil fuels violate their right to a healthy environment.

Another breakthrough came in India this month when the country’s Supreme Court ruled that Indian citizens have a fundamental right to be free from the harmful impacts of climate change, on the basis that the constitution guarantees the rights to life and equality. Meanwhile human rights-based climate cases are currently proceeding in countries including Brazil, Peru and South Korea, where the Constitutional Court has just begun to hear a lawsuit brought by young people and children.

One of the rulings the Indian Supreme Court considered in coming to its conclusions was a 2015 verdict that ordered the Dutch government to take stronger action to cut greenhouse gas emissions, showing how a judgment in one jurisdiction can help build a case in another.

Open civic space needed

Legal action takes time. It took the Swiss campaigners almost eight years, having been required to exhaust all avenues offered by their domestic legal system reaching the European Court.

Litigation will remain just one of the many vital tools used by climate campaigners, alongside high-level advocacy towards national governments and in global processes such as COP climate summits, consumer pressure, shareholder activism, campaigns for fossil fuel divestment, street protests and non-violent direct action.

But at precisely the time civil society is showing how much it’s needed, its ability to act is being squeezed, particularly by restrictions on protest rights. It’s a sad fact that activists resisting fossil fuel extraction in many global south countries have long been repressed. But in a disturbing trend over the last couple of years, many global north states are targeting climate campaigners.

Recently, the German and Italian authorities have criminalised activists with laws against organised crime, police in the Netherlands have detained thousands of protesters and the UK government has passed anti-protest laws and jailed peaceful campaigners. These growing restrictions could have the effect of sapping the energies and depleting the ranks of the climate movement at a time when it’s needed the most.

European states should take heed of the European Court’s ruling, acknowledge that climate change is a human rights issue and commit to both cutting their emissions and respecting the civic space for climate activism.

Andrew Firmin is CIVICUS Editor-in-Chief, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.

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By Janani Mohan
LONDON, Apr 25 2024 – For the first time in 15 years, the United States is reportedly planning to station nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom, a decision many experts interpret as attempting to counter growing geopolitical instability.

As the war in Ukraine rages on, nuclear posturing—including stationing nuclear weapons in other countries—is seen by nuclear powers as an important tool to prevent further escalation, reassure allies, and respond to changes in Russia’s posturing.

The stationing of nuclear weapons is a convenient loophole to the safeguards of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While certain countries under the NPT are non-nuclear weapons states and cannot develop their own nuclear weapons programs, they can host weapons stationed by nuclear weapons states.

Traditionally, nuclear powers have managed the entire control of their weapons—for example, by locating the nuclear weapons on joint bases.

However, while this control exists as a safeguard, stationing nuclear weapons as a means of posturing raises the question of what the difference is between “stationing” and “proliferating.”

If near-term security concerns are well-served by the recent US decision to move nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom, it could augment the US practice of stationing nuclear weapons in other countries—a practice with potentially harmful consequences for long-term nonproliferation goals.

Why the United Kingdom

As the closest US ally, the United Kingdom serves as an interesting location for this latest round of nuclear posturing, given that it already has its own nuclear arsenal.

Historically, the United States and United Kingdom have worked together closely on the development of nuclear weapons, starting with collaborations on the Manhattan Project. Since the 1960s, the United States started deploying nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom at regular intervals.

This practice carried on until 2008, when the United States removed approximately 110 B-61 nuclear bombs from the Royal Air Force base at Lakenheath—the same base believed to soon receive US nuclear weapons again. At the time the United States kept this withdrawal quiet, but some experts believed that it was intended to reduce and consolidate US nuclear forces in Europe.

Like with the secrecy in 2008, the United States has once again not formally commented on its recent shift in posture to re-station nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom. As a spokesperson for the UK Ministry of Defence said of the US decision, “it remains a longstanding UK and NATO policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at a given location.”

Why station nuclear weapons?

While the reasons behind this recent US decision are uncertain, stationing nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom potentially serves several US national interests.

The first and foremost reason may be to respond to growing tensions with Russia. NATO countries are very concerned about the Russian aggression and recently warned that there was a high likelihood for full-scale war with Russia within the next two decades.

In addition, the United States did not make the first move: Russia stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus and revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty last year. The stationing of US nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom in response appears therefore somewhat predictable, given the general Cold War mentality of responding in-kind to shifts in doctrine.

The decision to station nuclear weapons therefore postures the United States as paying attention to Russia’s recent escalations and signals its willingness to respond in the future with nuclear weapons, if necessary.

This decision reinforces the US nuclear deterrence policy, which states that: “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.”

The US decision can also be interpreted as aiming to complement—and therefore strengthen—the UK nuclear weapons arsenal. Currently, the United Kingdom has the smallest inventory of any of the NPT’s nuclear weapons states, and these warheads are all based at sea.

Meanwhile, the nuclear weapons that the United States will likely station in the United Kingdom are B61-12 gravity bombs, which are deployable by aircraft. This deployment would enable forces in the region to have further and distinct second-strike capabilities, while adding to the overall strength of NATO forces across Europe.

Finally, the US decision is one of the safest, when compared to other posturing options. It is no doubt safer to place nuclear weapons in countries already possessing nuclear weapons, like the United Kingdom, than in those that don’t, like Turkey.

Nuclear weapons states are lower risk as they would have minimal interest in proliferating these weapons. In addition, the United Kingdom already has sophisticated security systems and safeguards that would reduce both security risks and costs for the United States.

So why worry?

The stationing of US nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom is unlikely to increase the physical risk of proliferation: Malicious actors are not more likely to gain access to nuclear weapons given the UK security apparatus. However, there are potential risks to the framework of nonproliferation itself.

By re-stationing nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom, the United States is conveying that it is concerned over current nuclear tensions and that it might need to respond with nuclear weapons if attacked, which could increase future incentives for proliferation.

Stationing nuclear weapons in non-nuclear weapons states has always been an interesting gap in the nuclear nonproliferation frameworks of the NPT. However, regardless of the differences between “stationing” and “proliferating” nuclear weapons, the overall expansion of nuclear weapons still risks a cycle of escalation.

Actions like the recent US decision may reduce taboos on the expansive stationing of nuclear weapons, thereby providing incentives for proliferation as a solution to counter increased aggression by countries, like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

For example, some Ukrainian policymakers have already unofficially suggested that Ukraine should “restore [its] nuclear status”—which means developing its own nuclear weapons—to deter Russia. Although such statements are intended to convince the United States and NATO to provide Ukraine with some form of nuclear guarantees, they also suggest that an increasing need for nuclear deterrence inherently comes with increased risk of nuclear proliferation.

The risk of escalation may explain the current US and NATO strategy of stationing nuclear weapons semi-secretively. The United States ensures that its adversaries know that it is stationing nuclear weapons in allied countries like the United Kingdom, but adversaries are left with uncertainties about where those forces exactly are as the United States never formally discusses this posture.

This strategy not only increases US deterrence, it may also reduce some of the escalatory impact of explicitly re-positioning nuclear weapons, while still allowing the United States to respond to Russia.

Given proliferation concerns, such escalation-control practices are therefore important to maintain as the United States moves nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom, as well as other countries in the future.

Although it is yet to be seen if the recent US decision has a meaningful impact on nonproliferation, nuclear powers must work to prevent nuclear weapons stationing from eroding norms surrounding nuclear nonproliferation.

Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Janani Mohan, a PhD candidate in international studies at Cambridge University, is a Gates Cambridge Scholar. She holds a MA in international policy.

IPS UN Bureau

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By Philippe Benoit
WASHINGTON DC, Apr 25 2024 – Artificial intelligence provides amazing potential for advancement across fields, from medicine to agriculture to industry to the entertainment business, even as it generates significant concerns. AI can also improve the efficiency of energy production and use in ways that can reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

But AI requires a lot of computational capacity, powered by electricity which can in turn generate additional emissions.

Unfortunately, according to the climate modeling of the International Energy Agency and others, there isn’t room for a new additional source of energy emissions. Consequently, AI must have net zero emissions to uphold our climate goals.

AI can lower emissions in a multitude of activities across a variety of sectors. For example, AI can help reduce the emissions from manufacturing, food systems and road transport while increasing zero-carbon electricity production from solar and wind farms.

As AI and the necessity for more electricity production take off and possibly accelerate even beyond current projections, it is important to manage potentially significant increases in greenhouse gas emissions that would undermine our climate goals

But recent reports point to burgeoning demand, notably in the U.S., for more electricity production, driven in part by the computing needs of AI. With that comes related rising emissions.

Moreover, as Nividia announced its newest, most powerful AI performance chip, rising demand for AI and the electricity it needs will likely increase even further. And this will happen not just in the U.S., but worldwide, as reflected in Saudi Arabia’s plan to invest $40 billion in AI.

While there may be some efficiency gains because of AI, we can anticipate a net increase in electricity demand, particularly as the entertainment industry and others develop new and creative uses for AI.

This AI-driven increase will likely begin within the next several years, well before the power network has had the time to convert from the current fossil fuel-based system to a low-emissions renewables-dominated one.

Consequently, expect more emissions from the power sector in the near term. Over the longer term, it will also reduce the available carbon budget, which is the amount of future emissions that can be accommodated within internationally agreed temperature targets.

The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 climate scenario and similar climate pathways are built on balancing carbon dioxide emissions from the energy sector and carbon dioxide removals. Deploying renewables, energy efficiency, fuel switching and other low-carbon technologies are keys to lowering emissions to a level that can be balanced through removals.

Unmanaged AI, however, may hamper this effort, as its thirst for electricity results in a potential new source of emissions to be eliminated. AI needs to “pay for itself” regarding the climate by having net zero emissions and, preferably, even net negative emissions.

How can we accomplish this? First, there must be a concerted effort to power data centers and other AI-related infrastructure through renewables in a manner that does not cannibalize low-emissions electricity generation projects for households and other consumers. Governments and the private sector — including local or remote data center users and private capital — must work together to increase investment in and accelerate renewables deployment.

A second possible tool is to add a high load computational surcharge for AI users and possibly other large computer activities, such as cryptocurrency mining, to help finance additional investment in renewables.

Third, AI’s climate impact should be added to discussions on managing possible negative effects, such as AI’s potential for misinformation and disruptions to job markets. For example, the United Nations recently approved a U.S.-led resolution to make AI “safe, secure and trustworthy.” Similar initiatives need to be expanded to address AI’s potential emissions impact.

Fourth, and potentially most effectively, AI needs to be turned on itself to find mechanisms that result in net zero emissions and even make net negative emissions possible. This should include the development of innovative emissions reduction measures, as well as more ways to increase zero-carbon electricity production with a focus on achievable solutions.

There is also a need for better methodologies to measure both the increase and the savings in emissions that AI generates. This fourth pole should involve a combination of private sector-led action, inter-governmental initiatives and public-private research efforts.

As AI and the necessity for more electricity production take off and possibly accelerate even beyond current projections, it is important to manage potentially significant increases in greenhouse gas emissions that would undermine our climate goals. Governments, businesses and others should integrate the need for net zero AI emissions into their discussions on addressing AI’s impacts.

This oped was first published in The Hill

Philippe Benoit is the managing director at Global Infrastructure Advisory Services 2050. He previously held energy sector management positions at the International Energy Agency and the World Bank, and most recently was adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.